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ABSTRACT
Many people believe that the problem of climate change would be best
handled by  an  international  agreement that includes a system  of "cap-and-
trade.  "Such  a system would impose a global cap on greenhouse  gas emissions
and allocate tradable emissions permits. This proposal raises a crucial but
insufficiently explored question: How should such permits be allocated? It is
tempting to suggest that in principle, a cap-and-trade  system should allocate
permits on a per capita basis, with the idea that each person should begin with
the same entitlement, regardless of place of birth. This idea, pressed by many
analysts and by  the developing world, can be defended on  grounds of either
welfare  or fairness. But  on  both grounds, per capita allocations run  into
serious  objections.  If  fairness  is  understood  in  terms  of  equally  or
proportionally  sharing the burdens of a climate treaty, per capita allocations
are not fair because they  do  not take into account all the  effects of such  a
treaty. Any  agreement to  reduce greenhouse gas emissions  will give  more
benefits to some nations than to  others, and will impose more costs on some
nations than on others; in these circumstances,  per capita emissions rights give
the  appearance but  not  the  reality  of fairness.  For  those  who  seek
redistribution  to those who need help, on grounds of either welfare or  fairness,
per capita allocations of emissions rights are at best a mixed blessing. Some
rich  nations  are  highly  populated, and  some  poor  nations  have  small
populations;  there is essentially no relationship  between size of  population and
per capita wealth.
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Per capita allocations would also create serious incentive problems, and
they  would face  decisive objections from  the  standpoint of feasibility: Per
capita rights would transfer  hundreds of billions of dollars annually  from the
United States to China and India, and the United States is most unlikely to sign
a treaty with  that consequence. Per capita allocations must be compared with
other approaches, including those based on existing emissions rates and those
with  self-conscious  redistributive aims.  Any  system  of  allocation should
balance welfarist and fairness goals with feasibility constraints; per capita
allocations do a poor job of achieving that balance, and an insistence on that
approach might make  it impossible for nations to  agree on  a climate treaty.
These  conclusions have general implications for  thinking about normative
goals and  practical  limitations  in the context of international  law.
INTRODUCTION
Many  people  believe  that  the  problem  of  climate  change  should  be
handled  by  some  kind  of international  cap-and-trade  system.1  Under  this
approach,  participating  nations,  and  perhaps  the  entire  world,  would  create  a
''cap"  on  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Nations  would  be  allocated  specified
emissions rights, which could be traded in return for cash. A system of this kind
might well be the most effective and efficient method of reducing emissions.2
By  itself,  however,  the  proposal  for  a  cap-and-trade  system  does  not
answer a crucial question:  How should such a system allocate emissions rights?
It  is  tempting  to  suggest  that  the  status  quo,  across  nations,  provides  the
appropriate baseline. On one view, emissions might be frozen at existing levels,
so  that every  nation has the  right to its  current level  of emissions. On  a more
aggressive  view,  generally  captured  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol, 3  all  or  most
signatory  nations  should  reduce  their  emissions  levels  by  a  specified
percentage,  again taking  the status  quo  as the foundation  for reductions. 4  The
status  quo  approach  might  have  intuitive  appeal,  but  it  is  also  somewhat
arbitrary  and  raises  serious  questions  from  the  standpoint  of equity.5  Why
should  climate  change  policy  take  existing  national  emissions,  reflecting
existing  national energy uses, as a given  for policy purposes?  Should  a nation
with  three  hundred  million  people  be  given  the  same  emissions  rights  as  a
nation  with  one  billion  people,  or  forty million  people,  simply  because  the
emissions of the three nations, at the current time, are roughly equal?
1.  See, e.g.,  RICHARD  B.  STEWART  &  JONATHAN  B.  WIENER,  RECONSTRUCTING  CLIMATE
POLICY  (2003).
2.  See id.
3.  See Kyoto Protocol  to the  United Nations Framework  Convention  on Climate Change,
Dec.  10,  1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998)  [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
4.  This  is  an  oversimplification.  See  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  WORST-CASE  SCENARIOS  87-90
(2007), for qualifications.
5.  WILLIAM  D.  NORDHAUS  &  JOSEPH BOYER,  WARMING  THE WORLD  149-168  (2000).
[Vol.  97:51
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Raising these questions, many observers have strenuously urged that in an
international  agreement,  emissions  rights  should  be  allocated  by  reference  to
population, not to  existing  emissions.
6  The intuition here  is that  every person
on the planet  should begin with the same  emissions  right; it  should not matter
whether people  find  themselves  in a nation whose existing emissions  rates are
low  or  high.  Those  concerned  about  the  welfare  of developing  nations  are
especially interested in per capita allocations  of emissions rights.7  Why  should
a poor nation  with a  large  population be  required  to stick  close  to  its current
emissions  level, when wealthy nations with  identical populations are permitted
to  emit far more?  Why  should existing  distributions of wealth,  insofar as they
are  reflected  in  current  emissions,  form  the  foundation  for  climate  change
policy?  More bluntly:  Why should the United  States be given  emissions rights
that dwarf those of, say, India, which has a much larger population?
This  argument  might  well  be  connected  with  a  general  "right  to
development." 8 If the status quo is the baseline  for allocating  emissions rights,
6.  See, e.g.,  NATIONAL  DEVELOPMENT  AND REFORM  COMMISSION,  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  OF
CHINA,  CHINA'S  NATIONAL  CLIMATE  CHANGE  PROGRAMME  58  (2007),  available  at
www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChinaIUpFile/Filel  88.pdf  [hereinafter  CHINA'S  NATIONAL
CLIMATE  CHANGE  PROGRAMME];  DANIEL  BODANSKY,  PEW  CENTER  ON  GLOBAL  CLIMATE
CHANGE,  INTERNATIONAL  CLIMATE  EFFORTS  BEYOND 2012:  A  SURVEY  OF  APPROACHES  (2004),
available at www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/2012%20new.pdf  (describing  several  per  capita
approaches);  ANIL  AGARWAL,  MAKING  THE  KYOTO  PROTOCOL  WORK:  ECOLOGICAL  AND
ECONOMIC  EFFECTIVENESS,  AND  EQUITY  IN  THE  CLIMATE  REGIME,  available  at
http://www.cseindia.org/html/eyou/climate/pdf/cse-stat.pdf;  ANIL  AGARWAL  ET  AL.,  GLOBAL
WARMING  IN  AN  UNEQUAL  WORLD  (1991);  TOM  ATHANASIOU  &  PAUL  BAER,  DEAD  HEAT
(2002);  DONALD  A.  BROWN,  AMERICAN  HEAT  214  (2002);  PETER  SINGER,  ONE  WORLD  35
(2002);  Ann  P.  Kinzig  &  Daniel  M.  Kammen,  National Trajectories of Carbon Emissions:
Analysis of Proposals  to Foster the Transition to Low-Carbon Economies,  8  GLOBAL  ENVTL.
CHANGE  183  (1998);  Juliane  Kokott, Equity in International  Law, in  FAIR  WEATHER?  173,  188
(Ferenc  L.  T6th  ed.,  1999);  Hermann  E.  Ott  &  Wolfgang  Sachs,  The  Ethics of International
Emissions  Trading, in  ETHICS,  EQUITY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  NEGOTIATIONS  ON  CLIMATE
CHANGE  159,  159-68 (Luiz Pinguelli-Rosa & Mohan Munasinghe  eds., 2002) ("The equal right of
all  world citizens  to the  atmospheric  commons  is therefore  the  cornerstone of any viable  climate
regime.");  Ambuj  D.  Sagar,  Wealth,  Responsibility,  and  Equity:  Exploring an  Allocation
Framework  for Global GHG Emissions, 45  CLIMATIC  CHANGE  511  (2000);  Sven  Bode,  Equal
Emissions per Capita over Time-A  Proposal to Combine Responsibility and Equity of Rights
(Hamburg  Inst.  of  Int'l  Econ.,  Discussion  Paper  No.  253,  2003),  available  at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftm?abstract  id=477281;  see  also  J.  TIMMONS  ROBERTS  &
BRADLEY  C. PARKS,  A CLIMATE OF  INJUSTICE  144-46  (2007) (describing international support for
the  per  capita  approach);  STEVE  VANDERHEIDEN,  ATMOSPHERIC  JUSTICE  (2008);  Juan-Carlos
Altamirano-Cabrera  &  Michael  Finus,  Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate
Agreements, 9  J.  APPLIED  ECON.  19  (2006); Malik  Amin Aslam, Equal Per Capita  Entitlements:
A  Key  to Global Participation  on  Climate Change?, in  BUILDING  ON  THE  KYOTO  PROTOCOL:
OPTIONS FOR  PROTECTING  THE  CLIMATE  175  (Kevin  A.  Baumert  ed.,  2002);  Jeffrey  Frankel,
Formulas  for Quantitative  Emissions Targets, in ARCHITECTURES  FOR AGREEMENT  31, 40 (Joseph
E. Aldy &  Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007)  (noting developing world demand  for per capita system).
7.  See, e.g.,  CHINA'S NATIONAL  CLIMATE CHANGE  PROGRAMME,  supra note 6; Altamirano-
Cabrera & Finus, supra note 6; Frankel, supra  note  6; Kinzig & Kammen, supra note 6.
8.  See Declaration  on the Right  to Development,  G.A. Res.  128,  U.N.  GAOR,  41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4,  1986).
2009]
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poor  nations  are  likely  to  have  great  difficulty  in  achieving  the  levels  of
development  already  attained  by  wealthy  nations.  Perhaps  a  climate  change
agreement based on existing national emissions rates would violate  the "right to
development"  even if it would be both effective  and efficient.
The  significance  of  this  controversy  can  hardly  be  exaggerated.  The
United  States,  long an  obstacle  to a  climate  treaty, finally  committed  itself at
the  2007  climate  conference  at  Bali  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  binding
greenhouse  gas  mitigation  obligations. 9  Any  eventual  treaty  will  almost
certainly  include  a  cap-and-trade  system,  as  there  is  under  the  Kyoto
Protocol. 1  A  cap-and-trade  system  has  already  been  put  in  place  in  the
European  Union,1'  and  another  is  contained  in  bills  currently  before
Congress.12  Most notably,  the per  capita approach  has been  described  as "the
most politically prominent  contender  for any specific, global  formula for long-
term allocations,  with increasing  numbers  of adherents  in both  developed and
developing  countries,"' 3  including  India,  China,  and  as  many  as  130  other
countries, and the European Union. ' 4 However, the United States has  obliquely
indicated  discomfort  with  the  per  capita  system,  arguing  that  developing
countries  that  are,  or will  soon be,  industrial  powers-including  China,  India,
and Brazil-will  have to  accept significant mitigation  obligations  in  a climate
treaty. 1 5  It is  unlikely, we  will  argue,  that  a per capita  system  will  satisfy the
demands  of  the  United  States,  one  of  the  world's  leading  greenhouse  gas
emitters  on  a per capita basis. Meanwhile,  the per  capita approach  remains  an
influential political  and ethical paradigm for the distribution of permits because
it has not been subject to sustained challenge.
Our goal  in  this  Article  is  to  identify  the  problems  with  the  per  capita
system, in terms of both principle  and feasibility, and to suggest that its current
prominence  and popularity  are undeserved.  We  suggest that  advocates of per
capita allocations are correct on one point:  In principle, there is little to be  said
for  basing  emissions  rights on  existing  emissions  levels.  The  most plausible
9.  See  Bali  Action  Plan,  1  (2007),  available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/
application/pdf/cpbali-action.pdf.
10.  For good outlines, see STEWART & WIENER,  supra note  1;  NORDHAUS  & BOYER, supra
note  5,  at 145-68. For a brisk and illuminating treatment of policy questions  involving the climate
change problem, with occasional reference  to the Kyoto Protocol,  see  WILLIAM  NORDHAUS,  THE
CHALLENGE  OF  GLOBAL  WARMING:  ECONOMIC  MODELS  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  (2007),
available  at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice  mss_072407_..all.pdf.
11.  See United Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change,  Clean  Development
Mechanism  (CDM),  About  Clean  Development  Mechanism  (CDM),  Clean  Development
Mechanism, http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html  (last visited Aug.  10, 2008).
12.  See John M. Broder, Senate Panel  Passes  Bill to Limit Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6,  2007, at A39.
13.  See MICHAEL  GRUBB  ET AL.,  THE KYOTO  PROTOCOL 270 (1999).
14.  ROBERTS  & PARKS,  supra  note 6,  at 144.
15.  See Press Release,  The  White House, Statement by the Press  Secretary on the Decision
of the  Conference  of the  Parties  in  Bali  on  Climate  Change  (Dec.  15,  2007),  available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071215-1  .html.
[Vol.  97:51
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defense  of  this  approach  is  pragmatic.  Nations  are  unlikely  to  sign  an
international  agreement  if they  will  be  significant  net  losers,' 6  and  wealthy
nations  might  lose a  great  deal  from  any approach  that  does  not  use  existing
emissions  as the  baseline  for reductions.  But this pragmatic  point  shows only
that powerful  nations might well veto approaches  that are better  in principle;  it
does  not  show  that those  nations  would  be  correct  to  do  so.  As  a  normative
matter,  an approach  based  on per  capita  emissions  rights seems  preferable  to
one  based  on  existing  emissions;  there  are  strong  intuitive  claims,  rooted  in
welfarist and other arguments, on behalf of such an approach.
As  we  shall  see,  however,  a  per  capita  approach  runs  into  powerful
objections.  We  demonstrate this point by comparing the per capita approach to
several  others,  above  all,  those  based  on  existing  emissions  and  those  with
explicitly redistributive  aims.  Most  fundamentally,  per  capita  allocations  will
help some  rich nations  and hurt  some poor ones. The reason  is  that some  rich
nations are highly populated, and some poor nations are not. In fact there is no
correlation  between  population  size  and  wealth  per  capita. 1 7  If  global
redistribution  or  international  justice  is  the  goal,  the  per  capita  approach  is  a
highly  imperfect means.  From the  standpoint of those  who  favor  assistance to
poor  people  in  poor  nations,  per  capita  emissions  allocations  are  far  less
attractive  than  they  seem.  In  some  cases,  the  per  capita  approach  actually
creates  perverse  incentives.  From  the  standpoint  of  global  redistribution  of
wealth-justified  on  grounds of either  welfare  or fairness-other  approaches,
more  directly  focused  on  these  central  goals,  would  be  much  better.  A  key
point here, insufficiently  appreciated in the current debate, is that any emissions
reduction agreement will impose a disparate array of costs and benefits, varying
greatly across  nations;  in  these circumstances,  a per capita  approach  turns  out
to have far less appeal  on reflection than on first glance.
Many  people  support  the  per  capita  approach  not  on  redistributive
grounds, but  on the  basis of a  simple  and plausible  appeal  to fairness. "  The
atmosphere's  carbon-absorbing  features  are naturally  thought of as a  common
resource.  Perhaps  a common resource should be  divided  among  all  the people
in the world on the  ground that all people enjoy a right to  equal  opportunity  or
to  equal  human  dignity. 1 9  Indeed,  the  same  type  of argument  has  been  made
about  mineral  resources  discovered  under the  high  seas:  as no particular state
"owns"  these  resources,  they  should  be  divided  on  a  per  capita  basis.2 0  And
16.  See  JACK  L.  GOLDSMITH  &  ERIC  A.  POSNER,  THE  LIMITS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW
(2005).
17.  See infra note 52 and accompanying  text.
18.  See, e.g.,  Michael Grubb, James  Sebenius, Antonio Magalhaes  & Susan Subak, Sharing
the Burden,  in  CONFRONTING  CLIMATE  CHANGE:  RISKS,  IMPLICATIONS  &  RESPONSES  318-19
(Irving M. Mintzer ed.,  1992).
19.  Universal  Declaration of Human  Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,  art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
lstplen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec.  12,  1948).
20.  The Law of the  Sea Convention  provides  that such  resources  be divided  "equitably."
2009]
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given the constraints  of national sovereignty,  the resources should  be given  to
national governments on the basis of their states'  share of the global population
rather than divided up among individuals directly.
We will  show that the analogy to common property  is at best incomplete
and obscures the relevant moral concerns. If we compare a climate treaty  and a
treaty that provides  for the exploitation  of an  underwater  mineral  deposit,  we
immediately  see  that there  is  a crucial  difference  between  the two  settings.  A
climate  treaty, by reducing  global  warming,  will  have differential  benefits  and
costs for people  around the world. While  some people will benefit a great deal,
others will  benefit much  less or perhaps  not at all. By contrast,  exploitation of
mineral  deposits  has  minimal  differential  effects.  Per  capita  distribution  of
greenhouse  gas  emission  permits  would  distribute  the  revenues  from  the
abatement program on an equal basis, but would not equalize the overall effects
of that program.
In principle, the appropriate way to distribute permits is on the basis of the
aggregate  effects of the climate treaty in light of standard normative theories-
emphasizing,  for example,  distributive  justice,  welfare,  or  fairness.  From the
standpoint  of those  theories,  and  in  particular  on  welfarist  grounds,  the  per
capita  approach  does  have  major  advantages  over  an  approach  based  on
existing  emissions  because  it  would  provide  significantly  greater  benefits  to
poor people.  But  the per  capita  approach  would  also  have  some  unfortunate
incentive effects,  which complicate the inquiry. Even if those effects  are put to
one side, a per capita approach  is far inferior to an approach  that focuses  more
concretely on what the right normative theory requires.
We  shall also explore  a  series  of pragmatic problems  with the  per capita
approach,  including  its  incentive  effects  with  respect  to  future  international
agreements  and population  growth.  A pervasive  question involves  feasibility.
The  problem  of climate  change  cannot be  successfully  addressed  without  an
international agreement that includes all or almost all of the major contributors.
Per  capita  allocations  would  have  the  effect  of redistributing  hundreds  of
billions  of  dollars  from  wealthy  nations,  above  all  the  United  States,  to
developing  nations,  above  all China  and India. For  this  reason,  insistence  on
per  capita allocations  would  effectively  doom  any  climate  change  agreement.
We  offer  some  brief remarks  about  the  relationship  between  this  pragmatic
constraint and some of the underlying questions of principle.
Our conclusions  are that on welfarist  grounds,  the per  capita approach  is
at  most  a  crude  second-best,  and  that  it  faces  decisive  objections  from  the
standpoint of feasibility. Insistence  on that approach would effectively doom an
international  effort  to  reduce  the  risks associated  with  climate  change.  And
However, that  term has multiple  meanings  and is left  undefined. See United Nations Convention
on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  Dec.  10,  1982,  1833  U.N.T.S.  397  [hereinafter  Law  of  the  Sea
Convention].
[Vol.  97:51
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while our focus  throughout  is  on the problem  of climate  change,  the  analysis
will  have  general  implications  for  issues  of international  law,  where  treaty
development  frequently raises questions about the relationships among welfare,
fairness,  and  feasibility.21 Despite  those general  implications, we should  stress
that  our  goals  are,  in  one sense,  quite modest.  We  do not attempt to  sketch a
climate  change  agreement  here,  and  we  do  not  mean  to  reach  a  general
conclusion on how emissions rights should, in fact, be allocated. In establishing
the  problems  with per  capita  allocations,  we  mean to  take  one  step  along  the
way  toward  answering  the  most  difficult  questions  about  the  relationships
among climate change, welfare, and justice.
Part  I  of this Article  describes  current  and  projected  emissions  rates  of
major global  contributors.  Part II  explains the  subtle distributive effects  of the
per  capita  approach,  compared  to other  approaches.  Part  III,  the  heart  of the
Article,  shows  that  the  per  capita  approach  is  unattractive  on  welfarist  and
fairness  grounds.  Part IV argues that the per capita approach,  even if appealing
in principle, is unlikely to be feasible.
I
AGGREGATE EMISSIONS VERSUS PER CAPITA EMISSIONS
In this Part, we provide relevant facts in order to provide a background  for
analysis  of possible allocation  schemes.  We are aware that particular  estimates
are  much disputed and that they are subject to  change over  time. Our principal
goal  is not to insist on specific  numbers, but to establish that there are dramatic
differences  between  national emissions  in the  aggregate and national  emissions
on a per capita basis.
A. Aggregate Emissions
An  international  agreement  might  allocate  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)
emissions  rights in many different ways. If existing national emissions  rates are
used  as the guide, a recent ranking across nations would look like this:22
21.  An  especially helpful  discussion  is  SCOTT  BARRETT,  ENVIRONMENT  AND  STATECRAFT
335-358 (2003).
22.  Tables  generated  by  World  Resources  Institute,  Climate  Analysis  Indicators  Tool,
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly  (last visited  Aug.  14,  2008)  [hereinafter  Climate Analysis
Indicators Tool]. Excludes  land use change.
20091
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Table  1: GHG Emissions-Total C02 Emissions  in 2004
Millions of
Rank  Country  Metric Tons
CO2
1  United States  5,888.7
2  China  5,204.8
3  European Union (25)  4,017.1
4  Russian Federation  1,575.3
5  Japan  1,304.2
6  India  1,199.0
7  Germany  856.6
8  United Kingdom  551.3
9  Canada  549.1
10  Korea (South)  507.0
11  Italy  482.2
12  South Africa  427.9
13  Mexico  415.3
14  Iran  407.6
15  France  396.7
16  Indonesia  368.0
17  Spain  355.1
18  Australia  350.9
19  Brazil  346.2
20  Saudi Arabia  342.9
21  Ukraine  329.6
22  Poland  304.0
23  Taiwan  276.6
24  Thailand  238.5
25  Turkey  229.2
26  Netherlands  187.1
27  Kazakhstan  178.4
28  Egypt  152.2
29  Malaysia  149.2
30  Argentina  145.6
31  Venezuela  140.2
32  Uzbekistan  131.9
33  Czech Republic  125.2
34  Pakistan  125.2
35  Belgium  119.2
36  United Arab Emirates  104.0
[Vol.  97:51
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37  Greece  98.8
38  Romania  96.1
39  Vietnam  91.8
40  Algeria  91.6
41  Nigeria  85.1
42  Iraq  84.4
43  Philippines  80.3
44  Austria  76.8
45  Korea (North)  73.1
46  Finland  72.1
47  Kuwait  70.5
48  Belarus  65.9
49  Portugal  65.1
50  Israel  63.8
51  Chile  63.4
52  Colombia  61.7
53  Hungary  58.9
54  Serbia & Montenegro  56.7
55  Sweden  56.1
56  Denmark  52.6
57  Syria  51.7
58  Singapore  50.1
59  Libya  49.8
60  Bulgaria  47.4
61  Switzerland  44.6
62  Ireland  43.6
63  Norway  42.4
64  Slovakia  39.8
65  Turkmenistan  39.5
66  Qatar  39.1
67  Morocco  38.5
68  Bangladesh  37.5
69  New Zealand  33.1
70  Oman  31.9
71  Azerbaijan  30.9
72  Peru  29.6
73  Ecuador  28.2
74  Cuba  25.8
75  Tunisia  23.8
Total for top 75 GHG emitters  30,674.1
It is evident that the world's leading  emitters account for a strikingly large
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percentage  of the  world's  emissions. Indeed,  the United  States  and  China, by
themselves,  are responsible for about forty percent of the world's total. Most of
the world's nations, including many poor countries, are trivial contributors.
Estimates  suggest  that  the  largest  contributors  are  likely  to  continue  to
qualify as such. But major shifts will occur, above all with emissions growth in
China and India, and emissions reductions in Russia and Germany.
Table 2: Carbon Dioxide Emissions Changes, 1990-200423
Country  % Change 1990-2004
China  108.3%
United States  19.8%
India  87.5%
South Korea  104.6%
Iran  110.7%
Indonesia  137.7%
Saudi Arabia  85.6%
Brazil  67.8%
Spain  59.0%
Pakistan  96.6%
Poland  -15.3%
EU-25  1.6%
Germany  -12.2%
Ukraine  -47.1%
Russia  -24.8%
With these trends, we can  offer a rough projection of changes to  2030. At
that time, the developing world is expected  to contribute  no less than  fifty-five
percent  of total  emissions,  and  developed  nations  are  expected  to contribute
forty-five  percent.24  The  United  States  is  expected  to be  well  below  China.
Here is one projection of changes  in emissions rates over time:
23.  Emissions  of C02 from energy-related  sources  only.  See Int'l  Energy Agency  [IEA],
C02 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION:  197 1-2004, 11.4-11.7  (lEA Statistics 2006) [hereinafter
C02  EMISSIONS  FROM FUEL  COMBUSTION:  1971-2004].
24.  ENERGY  INFORMATION  ADMINISTRATION,  OFFICE  OF  INTEGRATED  ANALYSIS  AND
FORECASTING,  U.S.  DEP'T  ENERGY,  INTERNATIONAL  ENERGY  OUTLOOK  2007  93,  tbl.Al,
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieoO7/pdf/0484(2007).pdf.
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Table 3: Relative  Contributions of Annual Carbon Dioxide  Emissions by
Country/Region (Approximate % of Worldwide Emissions)
25
1990  2003  2004  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030
United  23.5%  22.7%  22.0%  20.1%  19.4%  18.8%  18.7%  18.5%
States
OECD Eo  19.3%  16.9%  16.3%  14.6%  13.4%  12.4%  11.6%  10.9% Europe
China  10.5%  15.3%  17.5%  21.1%  22.4%  23.9%  25.0%  26.2%
India  2.7%  4.1%  4.1%  4.2%  4.4%  4.7%  4.9%  5.0%
Japan  4.8%  4.9%  4.7%  4.1%  3.8%  3.5%  3.3%  3.0%
Africa  3.1%  3.5%  3.4%  3.7%  3.8%  3.9%  3.9%  3.9%
For  our purposes,  the  most noteworthy  changes  involve  the  world's two
most populous  nations,  India and China, which  will be responsible  for nearly
one-third of the world's  emissions  in the relatively near future. And  while this
projection  is  fairly  recent,  it  is  already  outdated  because  of  unanticipated
explosive  emissions  growth  in  the  developing  world.  For  example,  China
apparently  surpassed  the  United  States  in  aggregate  CO 2  emissions  in  June
2007 or perhaps before. 
26
It should be  clear, from  these figures, why developing countries  are most
unlikely to be sympathetic to  an approach  that allocates emissions rights  on the
basis of existing emissions  levels.  Their own emissions  are expanding rapidly,
and  such  an  approach  would  be  especially  costly  to  them  because  it  would
force them to purchase emissions  rights  from other nations in order to develop
at  current  rates. For  example,  India  is  not likely  to be especially  enthusiastic
about the idea that if it is to develop at the rate indicated by "business as usual,"
it must  spend  a great deal  of money to  obtain permits  from the  United States,
Russia,  China,  or  Japan.  Notwithstanding  this point,  it  might  be  tempting  to
infer, from  the numbers  projected  over  the next decades,  that an  international
agreement should allow China and the United States roughly the same level of
emissions  rights, and that the treatment of India should parallel the treatment of
Japan.  An  approach of this  kind  would build  on  that of the  Kyoto  Protocol,
which, as noted, requires percentage reductions from the status quo.
B. Per Capita  Emissions
The most obvious  objection to  the  status quo approach  is that the  figures
for per capita emissions are radically different. On a per capita basis, China and
India emerge  as  far  more  modest  contributors,  ranking  well  below  Barbados,
25.  See C02 EMISSIONS  FROM  FUEL  COMBUSTION:  1971-2004, supra  note 23.
26.  See Audra Ang, China Tops US  in Carbon Emissions, BOSTON  GLOBE,  June 21,  2007
available  at  http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articies/2007/06/21/chinatopsus  in
carbonemissions.
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Croatia,  Hungary,  and  Uzbekistan.  To  see  the  dramatic  differences  between
aggregate  emissions and per capita emissions, consider the following:
Table 4: GHG Emissions-Tons C02 per Person in 200427
Rank  Country  Tons CO2 Per Person
1  Qatar  50.3
2  Kuwait  28.6
3  Luxembourg  25.8
4  Brunei  24.4
5  United Arab Emirates  24.1
6  Bahrain  22.9
7  United States of America  20.1
8  Equatorial  Guinea  18.0
9  Australia  17.5
10  Canada  17.2
11  Trinidad & Tobago  16.8
12  Saudi Arabia  15.2
13  Finland  13.8
14  Estonia  13.3
15  Oman  12.6
16  Czech Republic  12.3
17  Taiwan  12.2
18  Palau  11.9
19  Kazakhstan  11.9
20  Singapore  11.8
21  Netherlands  11.5
22  Belgium  11.4
23  Nauru  11.2
24  Russian Federation  11.0
25  Ireland  10.7
26  Korea (South)  10.5
27  Germany  10.4
28  Japan  10.2
29  Cyprus  9.8
30  Denmark  9.7
31  Austria  9.4
32  Israel  9.4
33  South Africa  9.2
27.  Tables  generated  by  Climate Analysis Indicators  Tool, supra note  22.  Excludes  land
use change.
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34  Norway  9.2
35  United Kingdom  9.2
36  Greece  8.9
37  European Union (25)  8.8
38  Libya  8.7
39  Spain  8.3
40  Italy  8.3
41  Turkmenistan  8.3
42  Slovenia  8.2
43  New Zealand  8.1
44  Poland  8.0
45  Iceland  7.9
46  Slovakia  7.4
47  Serbia & Montenegro  7.0
48  Ukraine  6.9
49  Belarus  6.7
50  France  6.6
51  Seychelles  6.5
52  Bahamas  6.3
53  Malta  6.3
54  Sweden  6.2
55  Portugal  6.2
56  Bulgaria  6.1
57  Iran  6.1
58  Switzerland  6.0
59  Malaysia  6.0
60  Hungary  5.8
61  Venezuela  5.4
62  Barbados  5.3
63  Suriname  5.2
64  Uzbekistan  5.1
65  Antigua & Barbuda  5.1
66  Croatia  5.0
67  Lebanon  4.8
68  Romania  4.4
69  Macedonia, FYR  4.3
70  Jamaica  4.1
71  Mexico  4.1
72  Bosnia & Herzegovina  4.0
73  China  4.0
74  Chile  3.9
75  Lithuania  3.8
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The most striking  point here is that  while China  has  become  the world's
leading national emitter of greenhouse gases,  its per capita contributions remain
modest,  ranking  it  near  the  bottom  of the  list  of the  seventy-five  highest
contributors.  China's  per  capita  emissions  are  merely  one-fifth  those  of the
United  States, making  it natural  to question whether  the two nations should be
treated similarly in a climate change agreement.
The  case  of India may  be  even  more  pertinent.  India's  rapidly  growing
emissions  rank  it  among  the world's  leaders  on  an  absolute  basis, but  its  per
capita emissions are less than a third of those of China, about a sixth of those of
France,  and  about one-fifteenth  of those  of the  United  States,  ranking  it  one
hundred twenty-second  in the world.28
It  should  be  clear  that  per  capita  allocations  would  produce  radically
different distributional effects from allocations based on the national status quo.
Under  a  per  capita  system,  the  world's  largest  nations--China  and  India-
would  be  significant  net  gainers.  Indeed,  their  emissions  rights  would
undoubtedly  be worth large sums of money.  The principal  losers would  be the
nations that currently have high per capita emissions. The biggest loser, by far,
would probably  be the  United  States;  indeed,  the  losses  to  the  United  States
would  likely  be  in  the  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars. 29  (For  a  simple
comparison, those losses would, after a period of a decade, be well  in excess of
the  cost of the  Iraq War. 3 ) Because  of their  high per  capita  emissions  rates,
Canada and Australia would lose a great deal as well.
With this background, we should be able to glimpse the intuitive argument
on behalf of per capita allocations.  Nations  are not people;  they are collections
of people.  A  citizen  of China  should not be  given emissions  rights that  are  a
small fraction of those of a citizen of the United States. Nor should a citizen of
India be  given  emissions  rights  that  constitute  a  small fraction  of those  of a
citizen of Japan.  Each person should count for no more and no less than one. 3'
As  we  shall  see  in  Part  III,  this  intuition  might  be  grounded  in  concerns  of
28.  Id.
29.  Under the status quo approach,  the  United  States would be  allocated about  20 percent
of the  permits  (see  Table  7).  Under a per  capita  approach,  the  United  States  would be  allocated
about  5 percent of the permits (the U.S.  share of the global population). Assuming that the price of
a permit is $30 per metric ton of CO2 (the approximate  price  in the  EU market for  the first half of
2008)  and enough permits are  supplied to permit the output  rate of 30 billion metric tons per year
(roughly the current  global rate), then  moving from the status quo approach  (6 billion tons)  to the
per capita  approach  (1.5  billion tons)  would  cost the  United States  about $135  billion per year.
These  are  back-of-the-envelope  calculations  intended  to  give  a  rough  sense  of the  magnitude
involved,  and  should be  taken with  many grains of salt. See Mark  Milner,  Pollution: Value of
Global Carbon Trading Is Already Nearly Double Last Year's Figure  at £3Obn, THE  GUARDIAN,
July 9, 2008, at 43.
30.  See  Scott  Wallsten,  The  Economic Cost of the Iraq War, ECONOMISTS'  VOICE,  Jan.
2006, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l  134&context-ev.
31.  See Altamirano-Cabrera  & Finus, supra note 6, at 32.
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either welfare or fairness. But before we investigate these issues, it is necessary
to  untangle  some  complexities.  An  initial  task  is  to  obtain  a  better
understanding of the effects of a per capita approach.
II
A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF ALLOCATION
In this section, we briefly describe the distributive effects of the per capita
approach,  and  compare  it to  other  approaches.  Our  goal  is  to  show  that  in
important ways, the actual effects are not what might be anticipated.
A.  Status Quo Approach
Suppose that a firm consumes energy and other inputs to create goods that
it  sells on the market. Let us suppose that for every  unit of energy that the firm
consumes,  it generates greenhouse  gases that have a social cost of $10.
One  approach  to  greenhouse  gas  regulation  would involve  taxation.32  In
this  example,  the  optimal  tax  would  be  $10  per  unit of energy-the  amount
necessary to ensure  that the  firm  uses  a unit of energy only  when the  private
benefit exceeds the social cost Alternatively (and identically), the  firm could be
prohibited  from  consuming  energy  unless  it  bought  a  permit  from  the
government  at a price  of $10.  Let us  stipulate  that if the permit  is traded,  the
price would be $10  as well.
Both the tax system and the permit system would raise revenue  as well as
deter  the emission of greenhouse  gases.
33  In this example, each  system would
generate  revenue  of $10  per unit of energy. That money could be spent in any
way;  for example, the revenue could go into the treasury of the government that
levied  the  tax  or  sold  the  permit,  and  then  used  for  ordinary  budget
expenditures  or  to  reduce  general  taxes.  Note  that  the  revenue  raised  would
partially but not fully offset the immediate loss to consumer welfare in the form
of higher  prices.  Firms  would pass  the  tax  along  to  consumers,  who  would
either pay  the higher  price  (and have  less money to buy  other things)  or buy
fewer  energy-intensive  goods.  However,  we  assume  that  in  the  aggregate
people  would  be  better  off:  the  environmental  benefits  would  exceed  the
welfare  losses  from  reduced  consumption. 34  Otherwise,  there  would  be  no
reason to negotiate a climate treaty.
Now imagine that the world consists of two nations:  Rich State and  Poor
State.  Rich  State  has  a  large  economy  and relatively  few  people,  while  Poor
State has  a  small  economy  and  relatively  many people.  For concreteness,  we
32.  This approach is defended  in NORDHAUS,  supra note  10.
33.  In  the example,  we  will ignore  the different  effects  of the systems  on energy  use. We
also  assume  throughout  that  the  two  different  countries  will  distribute  the  permits  allocated  to
them in the optimal fashion,  such as through an auction.
34.  We  bracket  the  question  whether  and  how  animals  should  be  treated.  See  Wayne
Hsiung & Cass R.  Sunstein, Climate Change and  Animals, 155 U. PA.  L. REV.  1695 (2007).
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might assume  that  Rich  State is  analogous  to the United  States  and that  Poor
State  is  analogous  to  India.  Suppose  that  Rich  State  consumes  100  units  of
energy  at  the  time  that  the  climate  treaty  goes  into  force,  while  Poor  State
consumes twenty  units of energy.  (For simplicity,  we  assume  that  Rich  State
and Poor  State  do not  trade;  citizens  of each  country  consume  the  output  of
firms in that country.)  Rich State has five citizens, while  Poor State has twenty
citizens.  Thus,  Rich  State consumes  twenty  units of energy  per  citizen;  Poor
State  consumes  one  unit  of  energy  per  citizen.  Table  5  displays  this
information:
Table 5: An Example
Aggregate energy  Population  Energy consumption per
consumption  capita
Rich State  100  5  20
Poor State  20  20  1
As we  explained  earlier, the  tax system would require  the government  of
each country to levy a $1  0-per-unit tax on each firm-that is, a tax equal to the
social cost of consumption of a unit of energy.  Rich State would tax  100  units
of energy  and receive  revenues  of $1000,  while  Poor  State would tax  twenty
units  of energy and  receive  revenues  of $200.  Under  the  permit  system,  the
treaty would authorize Rich State to sell one hundred permits and Poor State to
sell twenty permits. As  Table 6  shows,  the distributive  effects  of each  system
would  be  the  same:  Rich  State would  raise  $1000  in  revenue  and Poor  State
would raise $200 in revenue.
Table 6: Taxes versus Permits
Tax revenues  Permit
energy  unit of  (first column  x  Equivalent  revenue
second  permits  at $10 per consumption  energy  column)  permit
Rich Stat  100  $10  $1000  100  $1000 StateI
Poor Stat  20  $10  $200  20  $200 LState
We  will  call this  the  status quo  approach  because  it takes  as its  baseline
the  relative  use  of energy  in  the  status  quo. 35  If one  thinks  of the  treaty  as
"creating"  permits, then the treaty would distribute more permits to Rich  State
35.  In  the  literature,  this  approach  is  often  called  the  "business-as-usual,"  "historical
baseline,"  or "grandfathering"  approach. See, e.g., ROBERTS  & PARKS, supra  note 6, at 139.
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than to Poor State because  Rich  State consumes more  energy than Poor State.
The treaty  would  create  a total  of one  hundred twenty  permits,  and give  one
hundred permits to Rich State  and twenty permits to Poor State. Note that  the
effect of this treaty is identical to the tax approach described above.
As noted, the status quo approach to distribution is based on the amount of
energy consumption  at the time  the treaty  enters  into force;  it  is  analogous  to
the approach taken in the  Kyoto Protocol.36 Because  Rich State consumes  five
times  as much  energy  as  Poor  State,  Rich  State  receives  five  times  as  many
permits  as  Poor  State.  And because  wealthy  countries  consume  more  energy
than poor countries, the  status quo approach  seems to favor wealthy countries.
Of  course,  any  judgment  about  whether  particular  nations  are  "favored"
depends  on a baseline.  Rich  State will  surely  point out that its own firms pay
the revenue that it obtains  from its extra permits,  so that the effects wash out. It
is  puzzling  that  a  uniform  emissions  tax  is  not  intuitively  taken  to be  unfair
while  the  status  quo  approach  to  emissions  rights  is  often  found
objectionable-even  though the two are identical in their effects. But at least it
can be  said that  the  status quo  approach  will generally  give  more  permits  to
wealthy nations than to poor ones, holding population constant, simply because
wealthy nations tend to emit more greenhouse  gases.
B. Alternative Approaches
Now let us consider some alternative approaches,  including the per capita
approach.  For  example,  under  the  per  nation  approach,  the  treaty  would
distribute equal numbers  of permits to  every nation.  Rich State and Poor State
would each receive  sixty permits. This approach also does not seem intuitively
fair.  All  nations  would  receive  the  same  number  of permits,  but  they  must
spread  the revenues  from the permits among  different  numbers  of citizens.  In
effect,  Poor  State's  twenty  citizens  would  receive  three  permits  each;  Rich
State's five  citizens  would  receive  twelve  permits  each,  though it  is  unlikely
that the government would directly hand out permits to citizens.
The  per  capita  approach  seems  much  better  on  this  score.  Each  nation
would receive  permits  in  proportion  to  its  population.  In  our  example,  the
climate  treaty  provides  a total  of one  hundred twenty  permits,  so  Poor  State
would  receive  ninety-six  permits  and  Rich  State  would  receive  twenty-four
permits. Each citizen in both countries would receive, in effect, 4.8 permits.
A  final  approach  that  we  will consider  will  be  called  the  redistributive
approach.  Under  this  approach,  all the  permits  would be  given to  whichever
country is poorer, at least up until the point at which wealth is equalized among
countries.  If we assume that Poor  State is sufficiently poorer  than  Rich State,
the  redistributive  approach would require that  all  one  hundred twenty permits
be  given  to Poor  State.  Poor  State  would then sell  twenty permits  to  its own
36.  See BARRETT, supra note 21, at 358-98.
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firms  and  one  hundred  to  Rich  State's  firms,  thus  acquiring  all  the  revenue
from  the permit  system.  Table  7  displays  the  permit  allocations  for the  four
approaches we have discussed:
Table 7: Four Permit Allocation  Schemes
Status quo  Per nation  Per capita  Redistributive
Permits  Per  Permits  PePermits  Per  Permits  Per capita  capita  capita  capita
Rich  100  20  60  12  24  4.8  0  0 State
Stat  20  1  60  3  96  4.8  120  6 Lstate  II  II  IIII  I
Other  approaches  are  possible,  including  mixed  approaches  that  fall
between  the  various  approaches  described  above.  For  example,  one  could
allocate permits on the basis of a formula that weights both population size and
poverty.37 For simplicity, however,  we  will confine  our discussion  to the  four
approaches  described  above:  status  quo,  per  nation,  per  capita,  and
redistributive.
C. A Note on Ex Post  Efficiency
From what we  will call  the "ex post  efficiency" perspective  (our reasons
for  using  this  term  will  become  clear  later),  all  of  these  approaches  are
identical,  assuming  that  the  trading  system  works  as  planned.38  Ex  post
efficiency  requires  that  energy  users  bear  the  social  (climate)  cost  of energy
use. If that cost  is $10  per unit of energy, then either a $10  tax  should be used,
or states should create the number of permits such that the market price  is $10.
All  of our  approaches  allow  states  to  set  the  price  of the  permits  at  $10  or
whatever the optimal price is, so they are all equally efficient.
The only  differences  among the  approaches  are  distributive.  As  we  saw,
under  the  status  quo  approach,  Rich  State's  government  would  receive  one
hundred  permits  and  Poor  State's  government  would receive  twenty permits.
Rich  State would sell  those  hundred permits to the Rich State  firms,  and  Poor
State  would  sell  the  twenty permits  to  the  Poor  State  firms.  Under  the  per
nation approach, Poor State would sell twenty of the permits to Poor State firms
and  forty of its permits  to the  remaining Rich  State  firms that  were  unable  to
purchase the sixty permits  distributed to the Rich  State government. Under the
per  capita  approach,  a  similar  outcome  would  occur.  If Poor  State  would
37.  See  BODANSKY,  supra note  6, for a long list  of proposals  that weigh  these  factors and
more.
38.  For discussion, see NORDHAUS  & BOYER, supra  note 5, at  149-165  (showing that costs
of climate change agreement  are greatly decreased with significant emissions trading).
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receive  ninety-six permits, its government  would sell  seventy-six  to  Rich State
firms.  The same would be true for the redistributive  approach,  as the Poor State
government  would  sell one hundred  of the  one hundred twenty  permits  it had
received to Rich State firms.
D. Distribution
We  have seen that under  the status quo system, Rich  State would receive
one  hundred permits  and Poor  States  would  receive  twenty permits.  Because
we  assume that  the social cost of consumption of a unit of energy  is $10,  the
permit price  would also be $10.  The governments  of each  state would sell the
permits, and receive revenues equal to product of the number of permits it sells
and the price per permit. Thus, Rich State would raise revenues of $1000  while
Poor  State  would  raise  revenues  of only  $200.  By  contrast,  the  per  nation
system  would give  Rich State revenues  of $600  from the  sale  of sixty permits
and Poor  State  revenues of $600  from the  sale of sixty permits. The per capita
system, where  Poor State  is four times  more populous  than  Rich State,  would
give  Poor State revenues  of $960  from the sale  of ninety-six permits and  Rich
State revenues  of $240  from  the  sale  of twenty-four  permits.  And  under  the
redistributive  system,  Poor  State  would  receive  $1200  from  the  sale  of one
hundred twenty permits and Rich State would receive $0.
These  are points about distribution across nations.  But it is also important
to  understand  the  distributive  effect  of the  various  policies  from  a per  capita
standpoint.  Under  the  status  quo  system,  Rich  State  would receive  $200  per
capita,  while  Poor  State  would  receive  $10  per  capita.  Under  the  per  nation
system,  Rich  State  would  receive  $120  per  capita,  while  Poor  State  would
receive  $30  per capita.  Under  the per capita  system, Rich  State would receive
$48  per capita,  as  would  Poor  State.  Under the  redistributive  approach,  Rich
State  would  receive  $0  per  capita,  while  Poor  State  would  receive  $60  per
capita. 
39
To  obtain  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  distributive  effects  of  the
alternative  approaches,  we need  to  take  into  account  the  benefit  side  of the
climate  treaty.  The  permit  system  would  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions,
resulting in mitigation  of climate change. These  benefits could be the same  for
Rich State and for Poor State,  or different. It is well known that the benefits of
reducing  climate  change  are not constant  across  nations.40  Some nations have
39.  The figures are obtained by  multiplying the per capita permit distribution from Table 7
and $10.
40.  See,  e.g.,  CLIMATE  CHANGE  RISK  REPORT:  COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY  RISK  ANALYSIS
AND  MAPPING:  2008/2009  (2008)  [hereinafter  CLIMATE  CHANGE  RISK  REPORT];  WILLIAM  R.
CLINE, GLOBAL  WARMING  AND  AGRICULTURE  (2007);  NORDHAUS  &  BOYER, supra note 5, at 91;
David  Anthoff et al.,  Equity Weighting and the Marginal Costs of Climate Change (Fondazione
Eni  Enrico  Mattei  Working  Paper  No.  43,  2007),  available at  http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=983032.
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far more to lose than others from, say, a 2.5 degrees Celsius increase in average
temperature,  while  other  nations  are  likely  to  be  net  gainers  from  such
41 warming.  Under  prominent  projections,  India  and  African  nations  are
especially vulnerable,  and the United States and China have significantly less to
lose.  Because  of increases  in  agricultural  productivity,  Russia  might  even
gain.42  Here  again  we  might  consider  both  aggregate  and per  capita  effects.
Suppose that the mitigation benefits of the treaty produce benefits of $2000 for
one state  and $0  for the other state,  or alternatively  $1000  for both states.43 In
the first case,  if the benefits  accrue  to  Rich State,  then  each of its few citizens
would receive  a benefit of $400; if the benefits  accrue to Poor State, then  each
of its many  citizens would receive  a benefit of $100.  In the  second case,  each
Rich  State  citizen  would  receive  benefits  worth  $200  and  each  Poor  State
citizen  would receive  benefits  of $50.  Table  8  summarizes  the  discussion  so
far:
Table 8: Distributive Effects of Permit Allocation  Schemes
Permits  Aggregate Net Benefits
System  (Rich!  Aggregate
Revenue  R: $2000  R:  $0  R: $1000 Poor)  P:  $0  P: $2000  P:  $1000
Status quo  100/20  1000/200  3000/200  1000/2200  2000/1200
Per nation  60/60  600/600  2600/800  600/2600  1600/1600
Per capita  24/96  240/960  2240/960  240/2960  1240/1960
Redistrib.  0/120  0/1200  2000/1200  0/3200  1000/2200
Per Capita  Per  Per Capita Net Benefits
System  Permits  Capita
(Rich/  Revenue  R:  $400  R:  $0  R: $200
Poor)  P:  $0  P:  $100  P:  $50
Status quo  20/1  200/10  600/10  200/110  400/60
Per nation  12/3  120/30  520/30  120/130  320/80
Per capita  4.8/4.8  48/48  448/48  48/148  248/98
Redistrib.  0/6  0/60  400/60  0/160  200/110
41.  For an overview,  see Eric  A. Posner  & Cass R.  Sunstein,  Climate Change Justice, 96
GEO. L.J. 1565  (2008).
42.  CLINE, supra note 40, at 18; NORDHAUS  & BOYER,  supra note 5, at 91.
43.  A related  point  is that the  cost of adjusting to the implicit carbon  tax may vary across
countries.  Some countries have  more abundant sources  of clean  energy, and some countries  have
industries  that can  more  cheaply  switch  to alternative  sources of energy.  For a  discussion in  the
context  of the  differential  effects  of per  capita  and  historical  approaches,  see  Joseph  E.  Aldy,
Divergence  in State-Level Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions,  83  LAND  ECON.  353 (2007).
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The  first  panel  of Table  8 displays  aggregate  figures;  the  second  panel
displays per capita figures. The first figure in each cell displays Rich State's (or
Rich  State citizens') gain; the  second figure does  the same  for Poor  State.  The
Permit  Distribution column  displays  the distribution  of permits, as  depicted in
Table  7. The  Aggregate  Revenue  column  multiplies  these  numbers  by  ten in
order  to produce  revenues  from  the  sale  of permits.  The  final  three  columns
display  the  net treaty  benefits  (revenue  plus  climate  benefits) under the  three
different  assumptions  about  the  differential  impacts  on  the  climate  of  an
effective  climate  treaty.  The  cells  with  bold  figures  show  outcomes  that  are
most nearly equal for the two states.
One  can  immediately  see  that  there  is  a  large  difference  between
equalizing  revenue  (Column  3) and  equalizing  the  net  benefits  of the  treaty
(Columns 4-6). Focusing on per capita effects  (Panel 2), we can  see that the per
capita  approach  equalizes  revenues,  but  it  does  not equalize  treaty  benefits
under  any of the  three  assumptions,  relative  to  the  other  approaches.  Indeed,
equalization of revenues  can occur amidst gross disparities in treaty benefits-a
point that raises serious questions about the idea that per capita distributions are
fair.
III
THE PER CAPITA APPROACH  IN PRINCIPLE
We now  turn to  the arguments  on behalf of the  per capita  approach. We
begin  with  welfarism,  showing  that  that  the  per  capita  approach  runs  into
serious  objections  from  that  perspective.  We  also  suggest  that  from  the
standpoint  of fairness,  the  per capita  approach  is  much  less  attractive  than  it
initially seems.
In discussions  about climate  treaties, defenders of the per capita approach
argue that it is fairer than  likely alternatives,  such as the  status quo approach.44
This argument  is  especially  prominent  in the  developing  world,  where  critics
ask:  Why  should  wealthy  nations  be  given  an  entitlement  to their  existing
emissions rights?45 This question seems  to be one of fairness, to which we will
turn  in  due  course.  But  the  question  can  also  be  translated  into  a  plausible
welfarist argument,  to  the effect  that the per capita  approach  is  more likely to
increase social welfare than any imaginable  alternative. It makes sense to begin
with the welfarist  argument, which is in some ways more tractable,  and which
will illuminate the fairness questions as well.
44.  See supra note 6; e.g.,  SINGER, supra note 6, at 35.
45.  See, e.g.,  VANDERHEIDEN,  supra note 6, at 226-39; Altamirano-Cabrera  & Finus, supra
note 6, at 32; Sagar, supra note 6.
HeinOnline  -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 71 2009CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIEW
A. FROM A WELFARIST PERSPECTIVE
1. The case for the per capita  approach
Welfarists  care  about  two  things:  maximizing  the  size  of  the  pie  and
distributing it equally.  The larger the pie, the  more is available  for everyone  to
consume;  all else being equal,  welfare should  rise with  consumption. 46  At the
same time, most welfarists believe  that the welfare,  or utility, obtained  from an
additional good declines.47  For instance, if you have zero apples, you would be
willing to pay a lot for one apple.  If you have ten  apples, however, you would
be  willing to  pay much less,  or as  little  as zero,  for an  eleventh.  Thus,  if the
entire  pie  is  given  to  one  person,  social  welfare  would  not  be  maximized.
Ideally,  the  pie  should  be  maximized,  and  then  it  should  be  divided  evenly
among  all  members  of society.  This  ideal  situation  assumes  no  disincentive
effects,  which  might  decrease  the  size  of the  pie.  We  can  easily  see  that  if
disincentive  effects  are  small,  welfarists  would  advocate  redistribution  of
resources from wealthy nations to poor nations,  or at least from wealthy people
in both wealthy and poor nations to poor people in wealthy and poor nations.4s
With respect to maximizing the size of the pie, we observed in Part II that
the per capita approach is no less ex post efficient than  any other approach. The
reason  is  that  the  climate  treaty  advances  ex  post  efficiency  by  giving
individuals  and  governments  incentives  to  minimize  their  emissions  of
greenhouse  gases.  Optimal  incentives  will  depend  on the quantity of permits,
but  not how  they  are distributed.  As long  as decision  makers  choose the  right
quantity, the size of the pie will be maximized.  Efficiency, in this crucial sense,
is not at stake in the choice among the four approaches.
Thus,  the  welfare  effects  of different  schemes  depend  mainly  on  their
distributional  effects;  other things  being equal,  distribution  to  those  who  are
poor will increase welfare. 49  The per capita approach  might well seem to have
attractive  distributional  effects and for that reason attractive welfare  effects.  To
the  extent  that  more  populous  countries  tend  to  be  poorer,  the  per  capita
approach will help poor people. Furthermore,  under the theory that poor people
have  the  highest  marginal  utility  for  a  dollar,  helping  poor  people  will
46.  We  put to  one side some  prominent puzzles  about the  relationship  between happiness
and  income.  See  ROBERT  H.  FRANK,  LUXURY  FEVER  (1999)  (suggesting  that  relative  wealth
matters,  not absolute wealth);  P.  RICHARD  G.  LAYARD,  HAPPINESS  (2005)  (exploring ambiguous
relationship between wealth and happiness).
47.  See  MATTHEW  D.  ADLER  &  ERIC  A.  POSNER,  NEW  FOUNDATIONS  OF  COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS  (2005).  Note  that  this approach  assumes that interpersonal  comparisons  of utility are
possible.  On  that  issue,  see  id.;  INTERPERSONAL  COMPARISONS  OF  WELL-BEING  (Jon  Elster  &
John E. Roemer eds.,  1991).
48.  See,  e.g.,  SINGER,  supra note  6;  Eric  A.  Posner,  International Law:  A  Welfarist
Approach, 73 U. CHI.  L. REV.  487 (2006).
49.  There is another type of efficiency at stake, which we  call "ex ante  efficiency."  We will
discuss this issue below.
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maximize global welfare.
Certainly  compared  to  the  status  quo  approach,  per  capita  allocations
seem  supportable  on  welfarist  grounds;  at  first  glance,  a  per  capita  system
seems to be the right way to proceed. The examples  of the United States on the
one hand,  and  China  and  India  on  the  other,  are  highly  salient,  because  the
former is rich and the latter two are poor by comparison.  To the extent that the
per  capita  approach  would  require  the  United  States  to  give,  in  essence,
hundreds  of billions of dollars  to  China and India,  it  might seem desirable  on
welfarist grounds.
At the  outset, of course,  there  is a serious complicating  factor.  Emissions
reductions  will  help  future  poor  people,  not  present  poor  people.  It  is  not
obvious  that  policymakers  in  wealthy  nations  should  attempt  to  help  future
poor people, who are likely to be far less poor than present poor people.5° If the
goal  is  redistributive,  current  poor  people  almost  certainly  deserve  priority.
This point greatly complicates the  claim that emissions  reductions are justified
on  redistributive  grounds.  Note,  however,  that  we  are  speaking  of emissions
rights, not emissions  reductions,  and emissions  rights  will benefit people  who
are  now  living.  For  this  reason,  the  redistributive  argument,  grounded  in
welfarist considerations, has considerable intuitive appeal.
2. Objections and concerns
We  have  said that welfarists  care  about equal  distribution, believing  that
money has  diminishing  marginal utility.  From their perspective,  the per capita
approach has three serious defects.
First  and most  fundamentally,  the  per  capita  approach  is  attractive  to  a
welfarist only insofar as more populous states tend to be poorer. Not all heavily
populated states are poor, however, and not all lightly populated states are rich.
For instance,  the United  States is both  large and rich, with a population  of 301
million  and  per  capita  GDP  of $46,000.  Bhutan,  on  the  other  hand, is  both
small  and  poor,  with  a  population  of two  million  and  a  per  capita  GDP  of
$1,400.51  The per capita approach, then, seems to be a crude and even arbitrary
way  to  redistribute  wealth,  especially  compared  to  the  pure  redistributive
approach,  which gives  few  or no permits  to  rich states  and all or  most of the
permits  to  poor  states,  regardless  of population  size.  We  assumed  away  this
problem  in our example  in  Part  II  because  we  stipulated  that  Poor  State was
both bigger and (as befits its name) poorer. But that assumption is unrealistic.
Indeed,  the  relationship  between  population  and  wealth  turns  out to  be
essentially zero. For a demonstration, consider Figure 1.
50.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 41.
51.  We  take  these  figures  from  the  CIA  World  Factbook,  available  at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
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Figure 1: Relationship Between  Population and Per Capita Wealth
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Clearly,  there are rich small  states  (upper  left),  and poor big  states (lower
right),  and  everything in between.  As Figure  1 shows,  there  is no statistically
significant correlation between population and per capita GDP.
Second,  the  permits-in  the  scheme  that  we  describe  in  Part  II-are
distributed  to  both  greenhouse  gas  winners  and  losers.  Some  poor  states  will
become  far  poorer  as  a result  of climate  change;  other  poor  states  are  less
vulnerable.53  Similarly,  some  rich  states  will  face  serious  adverse  economic
effects  from climate change; other rich states are  less vulnerable.54  Some  states
52.  The  figure shows  the  natural  logs of per capita GDP  and  population averaged  over  the
years  1980 to  2000. Taking the  natural log  of the  variables makes the  data points easier to see in a
manageable  figure.  The  correlation  coefficient  between  per capita  GDP  and population  is  -0.03 6
and  is  not statistically  significant.  The  data  are  taken  from  ALAN  HESTON  ET AL.,  CENTER  FOR
INTERNATIONAL  COMPARISONS  OF  PRODUCTION,  INCOME,  AND  PRICES  AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF
PENNSYLVANIA,  PENN  WORLD  TABLE  VERSION  6.2  (2006),  available  at
http://pt.econ.upenn.eduphp.site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php.
53.  Thus,  for  example,  India  is far  more  vulnerable  than  is  China.  See  NORDHAUS&
BOYER,  supra  note  5, at  91;  CLIMATE  CHANGE  RISK  REPORT,  supra note 40,  at  17.  Among  the
most  vulnerable  nations  are  Somalia,  Burundi,  Yemen,  Nigeria,  and  Afghanistan;  other  poor
nations,  including  Thailand,  Colombia,  Indonesia,  and  El  Salvador,  are  significantly  less
vulnerable.  CLIMATE  CHANGE  RISK  REPORT,  supra note 40, at  17.
54.  Thus, for example,  the  United States  is  far less vulnerable than many nations  in Europe.
NORDHAUS  & BOYER,  supra note  5,  at  91,  and  Canada  is less  vulnerable  than  the  Netherlands,
Austria,  and Germany, CLIMATE  CHANGE  RISK  REPORT, supra note 40, at  17.
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may even be  net gainers  from  climate change. 55 If distribution  is our concern,
why  should  two  highly  populated  poor  nations  receive  the  same  number  of
permits from a program  from which one  nation would gain a lot and another a
little-or  from  which  one  would  gain  a  lot  and  another  would actually  lose?
Ideally, permits should be distributed in light of these consequences, but the per
capita approach  fails to take them into account.
Third,  the permits  are allocated  to  the governments  of poor  states, not to
the  citizens  of poor  states.  This  distinction  matters  because  nearly  all  poor
states have a class of wealthy elites, and these wealthy elites usually control the
government,  or  at  least  have  considerable  influence  over  it.  Given  that  the
governments  in  these  states  already  are  unenthusiastic  about  redistributing
wealth  from  the  elites  to  the  poor,  it  is  questionable  that  they  will  use  the
wealth generated  by the permit scheme  to help the poor. They may well  prefer
to help the rich. We will return to this problem in Part IV.
The intuitive attractiveness of the per capita approach depends  on seeing it
in  isolation  from  all  of the  effects  of  a  climate  treaty.  Once  we  take  these
various factors into account, the per capita approach appears  far less attractive,
and  on  plausible  assumptions,  indefensible  from  the  standpoint  of the  very
rationales that most justify it at first sight.
We  agree  that  as  a  matter  of  actual  practice,  these  defects  are  not
necessarily  fatal  to  the  per  capita  approach.  Everything  depends  on  the
alternatives.  One might argue  in response that while  the per capita approach  is
not  ideal,  it is  still superior to  a system  that is its most likely alternative-one
that uses  status quo energy consumption as the baseline  and thus favors people
living in wealthy  and wasteful countries. Perhaps this response  is correct. But it
must acknowledge  the underlying problem, which  is that the per capita  system
is  only  indirectly  connected  to  the  underlying  normative  goal-indeed,  so
indirectly  that it is conceivable  in principle  that it has worse distributive effects
than the status quo approach.
A  welfarist  should  favor  redistribution  to  the  world's poor  to  the  extent
that  doing  so  is  feasible  and  does  not  excessively  reduce  aggregate  global
welfare.  But there  is no reason to  think that the per capita approach  to climate
regulation  is  the  right  way  to  redistribute  wealth  and thus  to  increase  global
welfare.  From  a  welfarist  perspective,  a  sensible  redistributive  policy  would
follow these general  principles:  redistribute  all resources rather than  shares  of
the atmosphere's capacity to absorb greenhouse  gases;  redistribute resources to
poor people rather than  to poor nations;  and redistribute  to poor nations rather
than to populous nations. If redistribution is to occur in the specific context of a
climate treaty, the  redistributive  approach,  sketched in  Part II,  would  be much
better than the per capita approach.
55.  See NORDHAUS  & BOYER,  supra note  5, at 91  (projecting, for  example,  significant  net
gains for Russia).
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3. More on welfare: ex ante efficiency
Arguments in favor of per capita distribution have, so far, focused  on what
we  have  called  ex  post efficiency  effects,  and neglected  the  possible  ex  ante
effects of the distribution scheme.  We discussed the ex post effects above,  and
showed that the ex post efficiency  effects of the different schemes are identical
(or  nearly  so).  The  same  cannot  be  said  for  ex  ante  efficiency.  From  that
standpoint,  the  effects  are  different,  and  the  per  capita  approach  has  some
significant drawbacks.
To  understand  the  difference  between  ex  post  and  ex  ante  efficiency,
recall  that any tax or cap-and-trade  system  that requires firms or individuals  to
internalize  the  social cost  of their greenhouse  gas emissions  is  efficient,  in the
sense that under these  schemes firms and individuals  will use energy only when
the social benefits (including their own profits or consumption) are greater than
the  social  costs  (including  the  costs  to  the  climate).  We  call  this  type  of
efficiency  "ex  post"  because  it  addresses  an  existing  problem, though,  to  be
sure, one that will continue  into the future.
On the other hand, the ex ante effect of a climate  treaty refers to  its effect
on  future  programs,  including those  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  greenhouse
gases.  Any treaty will establish  a precedent on which states will  rely, at least in
part,  as  they  negotiate  additional  treaties  in  the  future:  treaties  that  will  be
needed to handle  such global  problems as terrorism,  cross-border transmission
of diseases,  and  nation-building  efforts in failed states.  For example,  if the per
capita  approach  is used for a  climate  treaty,  then  it  might  suggest  itself as  a
basis for allocating the costs of an anti-terrorism treaty.
Similar  assumptions  are  routinely  made  about  domestic  programs.  For
example,  the U.S.  government  could alleviate poverty by  announcing one  day
that  it  will  take  most  of the  wealth  of rich  Americans  and  give  it  to  poor
Americans.  Such a program is not inefficient in the ex post sense: given that the
rich  have  already  accumulated  their  wealth,  they  cannot  retroactively  be
deterred  from  working  hard.  The  program  will  have  prospective  effect,
however.  Even if announced as a one-time event, people will assume that if the
government  implements such  a program today,  it might do so again tomorrow.
This  assumption will  influence  their ex ante behavior, reducing  their incentive
56 to work and save.
56.  These  effects are addressed  in the  law and economics  literature  on legal transitions, or
changes  in  the  law.  See, e.g.,  Louis  Kaplow, An  Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV.  L. REV.  509 (1986).  This literature  focuses on  domestic  law, where it is clearer  than in the
international  context  that  a  government  that  adopts  certain  policies  or  practices  toward  legal
transitions--compensating  or grandfathering  those  injured  by  the  transition,  for  example-will
affect  the  incentives  of  people  to  anticipate  legal  change.  We  extend  this  literature  to  the
international  setting;  there  is no  reason  to think that  the  differences  in settings  should  affect the
analysis.  The  transitions  literature  ignores  what  we  have  called  "ex  post  efficiency,"  instead
assuming  that  whatever  legal  change  that  is  introduced  is  dictated  by  efficiency.  The
environmental  literature,  by  contrast,  focuses  on  ex  post  efficiency  (for  example,  the  choice
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Suppose,  then,  that  a  climate  treaty  based  on  the  per  capita  approach
established  a  precedent.  How  might  such  a  precedent  influence  behavior,
compared  to the status quo approach?  It would create  two perverse  incentives:
encouraging population growth and discouraging economic  growth.
First,  the  per  capita  approach  would  establish  that  the  most  highly
populated  states  would  obtain  the  greatest  benefits  from  international
cooperation.  Governments  would  be  rewarded  for  pursuing  fertility  policies
that  maximize  the  size  of the  population.  To  see  why,  consider  a  state  with
population X and another state with population 2X.  Suppose that a future treaty
would limit the spread of infectious diseases, creating benefits of Y.  The states
would need to negotiate  a division of the surplus. With the per capita principle
in  place,  the  state  with  the  larger population  would  be  able to  claim  a  larger
portion of the surplus.
From  a redistributive  perspective,  this result  might seem  fair (unless  the
people  in  the  larger  state  are  richer),  but  in  terms  of prospective  incentives,
states  would  have  one  more  reason  to  grow  and  to  avoid  shrinking.  This
incentive  would be especially perverse from  the perspective of climate  change
because  more  people  will consume  more  of the  earth's resources,  though  the
exact  effect  of population  growth  is  complex.  On  the  other  side,  the climate
treaty,  to the extent that it fixes the  initial number of permits, will also restrain
growth.  Given  the  relatively  low  amount  of international  cooperation,  and
hence  the  relatively  low  amount  of treaty-making,  one  might  doubt  that  the
incentive  to expand  population  in  order to obtain  future  treaty  advantages  is
particularly  strong. To evaluate the extent of the problem we need to know  the
magnitude  and  not  merely  the  direction  of the  incentive  effect.  Still,  this
problem is a cost of the per capita approach that should be kept in mind.57
Second,  to  the  extent that  it  favors poorer  countries  (and that  is its  only
normatively  attractive  feature),  the  per  capita  approach  would establish  that
poorer states would obtain the greatest  benefits  from international  cooperation.
In  the  abstract  this  seems  desirable,  but governments  that adopt policies  that
promote  economic  growth  would  be  penalized  by  this  principle.  Most  rich
states get wealthy  because  they  have  good  institutions,  not  because  they  are
lucky  enough  to  have  natural  resources.
58  Citizens  invest  in  creating  and
between  permits  systems  and taxes)  and  generally,  although  not always,  ignores  ex ante  issues.
For  a  discussion,  see  Jonathan  R.  Nash,  Allocation  and  Uncertainty:  Strategic  Responses  to
Environmental  Grandfathering  18-22  (Jan.  24,  2008)  (unpublished  manuscript)  available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2650&context--alea.
57.  These  perverse  population  incentives  have  long  been  recognized.  However,  many
scholars seem to think that these  incentives can be eliminated as  long as allocations of permits are
made with reference to a past distribution of  population rather than to future populations. See, e.g.,
SINGER,  supra note  6,  at  36.  Such  an  approach  would not address the  perverse incentives of the
precedent for future treaties,  when high-population  states will invoke  the climate treaty as a basis
for demanding more favorable treatment.
58.  In  fact,  development  economists  have  gone  so  far as  to  identify  a  "resource  curse":
countries with  valuable  natural resources  often do worse than those that lack  them. See generally
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maintaining  good  institutions  because  good  institutions  deliver  wealth  and
other  benefits.  A  redistributive  principle  such  as  the  per  capita  approach
implicitly punishes states that do well economically, while rewarding states that
do poorly.
The  goal  of development  aid  over  the  past  decades  was  precisely  the
opposite:  to  give  governments  of developing  countries  an  incentive  to adopt
sound economic policies that promote growth. Because of fears that foreign aid
would  provide  incentives  not  to  grow,  donors  made  concerted  efforts  to
condition  aid  on  the  adoption  of sensible  growth  policies.59  The  per  capita
approach-and  indeed,  any redistributive  principle-is at war with the  lessons
of development  policy,  and  would  weaken  the pro-growth  incentives  that  are
currently given to developing states.
What  system, then,  is  optimal  for  ex  ante  efficiency?  The  ideal  system
would  give  states  an  incentive  to  identify  global  problems  in  advance  and
negotiate  treaties  to  solve  them  without  affecting  their  incentives  to  control
their populations,  invest in institutions,  and  so forth.  Our interest  in that  ideal
system  is  connected  with  International  Paretianism;  recall  that  this principle
means that states  are unlikely to enter into treaties unless they believe that they
will not be made worse off as a result.  60
But  treaties  that  solve  problems  generate  surpluses  beyond  the  amount
necessary to make states  indifferent between entering  and not entering  a treaty.
What  should be  done  with the  surplus?  It  is tempting  to think  that  one  could
distribute  the  surplus  without  affecting  incentives  ex  ante,  but  this  is  highly
implausible.  If one  could,  then  one  would  probably  want  to  distribute  the
surplus to  the poorest  countries rather  than on a per capita basis, which,  as we
argue,  is morally arbitrary.
From an ex ante  efficiency  perspective,  the best use  of the  surplus  would
be  to reward  the  states that  had taken  steps  in  advance  of the  treaty to  abate
greenhouse  gases.61  These  states  would  probably  be  the  European  states  that
accepted  binding emissions  reductions under  the Kyoto Protocol,  though  there
are  complexities  here,  since  not  all  European  states  accepted  meaningful
reductions  and  others  were  simply  taking  advantage  of  independent
RICHARD M.  AUTY, SUSTAINING  DEVELOPMENT  IN MINERAL  ECONOMIES  (1993).
59.  See David  Dollar & Victoria  Levin,  The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-
2003, 34 WORLD  DEV.  2034,  2034-36 (2006)  (describing  this view  as  an emerging international
consensus).
60.  The  Pareto  principle  in  economics  refers  to  the  idea  that an  allocation  of resources
makes at least one person better off and no one worse off compared to some  other allocation. We
do not attempt  to specify  here the  ingredients  of a  state's judgments about  what  would make  it
better off or worse off;  we agree  that some states have  altruistic goals and so include, in their own
welfare, the welfare of those  in other states.
61.  Hence the scholarly  support for banking systems under which  any future  climate treaty
would reward  states that make  abatement  efforts  prior to  treaty ratification.  See, e.g.,  Kinzig  &
Kammen, supra note  6.  For  a discussion  of the  use of this principle  in  domestic environmental
law, see Nash, supra note 56.
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technological  and demographic  changes in their country.
6 2
The larger point is that  such a distribution  would establish  a precedent  to
the effect  that when a global problem  exists, states that respond  quickly and in
advance  of a treaty  will  not be  penalized.  With  this  principle  in place,  states
would be more likely to act quickly and to negotiate  a treaty regime rather than
drag  their  feet.  For  example,  if  states  ever need  to  enter  a  new  treaty  that
regulates cybercrime,  they would know that first movers that have implemented
controls that reduce  dangers  to other states would not be penalized  and would
even be rewarded in some way.
From  the  standpoint  of ex  ante  efficiency,  the  per  capita  approach  has
serious drawbacks, even when compared with the seemingly unattractive  status
quo  approach.  As  we  have  indicated,  these  drawbacks  cannot  be  evaluated
without knowing the magnitude of the effects.  If, for example,  a climate change
agreement  had small consequences  for population growth,  and had little effect
on  incentives  in  the  context  of other international  agreements,  the  drawbacks
would not be a substantial concern. Our point is only that these drawbacks must
be investigated  in order to obtain a full account of the welfare  effects of the per
capita approach.
B. From a Fairness  Perspective
Ideas  about  fairness  play  a  significant  role  in  debates  over  the  proper
approach  to climate  change.
63  Fairness  can be  specified  in multiple  different
ways. We  venture  three specifications  here in  an effort  to see  whether the per
capita approach can be defended on fairness grounds.
1. Fairness  and the veil of ignorance
Many  scholars  reject  the  idea that  questions  of global justice  should  be
approached  in  welfarist  terms.
64  In  their  view,  the  goal  is  not  to  promote
aggregate  social  welfare;  it is instead  to do what  fairness  requires. Arguments
of this kind often posit  a veil of ignorance,  or "original  position,"  from  which
the  principles  governing  allocations  of  resources  might  be  chosen.65  In  the
standard  version of this  argument,  people behind the veil do not know  various
circumstances  of their lives;  they  do not know  their place  in  society,  or  even
66
their natural assets such as intelligence and strength.  The central  claim is that
62.  See  Kathryn  Harrison  &  Lisa  McIntosh  Sundstrom,  The  Comparative Politics of
Climate Change,  7  GLOBAL EN VTL.  POL.  1 (2007)  (describing  the differential  effects of the Kyoto
Protocol on European  countries).
63.  Fairness  concerns  are  the principal  ones  in  the  essays  cited  supra in note  6.  For the
most recent comprehensive  discussion, see VANDERHEIDEN,  supra  note 6.
64.  See  MARTHA  CRAVEN  NUSSBAUM,  FRONTIERS  OF JUSTICE  (2006);  THOMAS  WINFRIED
MENKO  POGGE,  REALIZING  RAWLS  211-80 (1989).
65.  See JOHN RAWLS,  A THEORY OF JUSTICE  118-23 (rev. ed.  1999).
66.  Id. at  118.
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principles  that would  be  chosen  behind  the  veil  qualify  as  fair, because  they
ensure  that  outcomes  are  not  a  product  of factors  or  considerations  that  are
irrelevant from the moral point of view. 67
Scholars who are attracted to this approach may  also want to suppose that
choosers  are  made  ignorant  of  the  nation  in  which  they  might  find
themselves. 68  If  deprived  of  that  information,  what  distributive  principles
would  they  select?  It  is  possible  that  in  the  international  context,  as  in  the
domestic  one,  they  would  select  welfarist  principles.  Perhaps  people  would
choose  to  maximize overall  welfare,  if placed  behind the veil. 69  But  it is  also
possible  that  people  behind  the  veil  would  take  particular care  to protect  the
least well-off, perhaps through  a version of Rawls'  difference  principle, which
permits inequalities only to the extent that they operate to  the advantage  of the
least  advantaged.70  There  is  a  vigorous  debate  over  the  application  of that
principle or imaginable  variations to the international  domain.71  Rawls  himself
believed that there would be real difficulties in adapting the difference principle
to  the  international  context. 72  But  even in  that  context,  the  idea  of a  veil  of
ignorance  may turn out to be helpful.73  Some philosophers  believe that the best
approach  specifies  a floor constraint, ensuring  that everyone  is  elevated above
some  threshold.74  Even  without  a  floor  constraint,  international  agreements
might be  developed  with  close  attention to  the  veil of ignorance,  which may
well require a great deal of redistribution across national boundaries.
7 5
We  need not pause  over the  philosophical  complexities  here.76  The  basic
point  is  that  welfarism  is  rejected  by  many  people  who  believe  that  severe
deprivation  for  some  cannot  be justified  by  large  welfare  benefits  for many.
Furthermore,  fairness  is often taken to require attention to  those who face  such
deprivation, whatever the welfarist calculus suggests.
7 7
Consider  a  common-sense  specification  of this  claim,  adapted  to  the
67.  Id.
68.  See POGGE, supra note 64, at 211-236.
69.  Cf  John  C.  Harsanyi,  Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality, 69
AMER.  POL.  Sci.  REV.  594 (1975)  (arguing that people  would  choose to  maximize average utility,
behind the veil of ignorance).
70.  See RAWLS, supra note 65 at 65-70.
71.  For varying perspectives, see NUSSBAUM,  supra  note 64, at 273-324;  POGGE, supra note
64.
72.  See JOHN  RAWLS, THE LAW  OF PEOPLES (1999).
73.  See id.; POGGE, supra note 64.
74.  NORMAN  FROHLICH  &  JOE A.  OPPENHEIMER,  CHOOSING  JUSTICE  (1992)  (finding that
people  would choose  to maximize utility with  a floor constraint, behind an  experimental  effort to
mimic  the  veil  of  ignorance);  cf  NUSSBAUM,  supra  note  64,  at  291-95  (discussing  idea  of
threshold).
75.  See NUSSBAUM,  supra  note 64.
76.  For a detailed treatment, see id. at 291-324.
77.  Welfarism  will also be rejected  by those  who believe  that principles of justice  do not
extend  across  borders.  See, e.g.,  RAWLS,  supra note  65  at  7;  Thomas  Nagel,  The  Problem of
Global  Justice, 33  PHIL. & PUB.  AFF.  113  (2005).
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climate  change problem.  Some nations  are  much richer  than others,  in  a way
that violates  the requirements of justice. 78 Perversely,  the status  quo approach
creates  a kind of entitlement  to the continuation of practices that violate those
requirements.  No such  entitlement  can be defended.  Even  if corrective justice
does  not require  high-emissions  states  to compensate  those  nations that  are at
special risk,
79  a climate  change  agreement would be  unacceptably  unfair  if it
made  development  more  difficult  for poor  nations.  Such an  agreement  would
be  especially  unfair  because  development  is  designed  to  remove  citizens  in
poor nations  from  difficult  conditions,  and to  allow  poor nations  to  achieve
something closer  to parity  with wealthy  nations. A per capita  approach  would
be the  most fair under this analysis,  because  it  counts every  citizen as no  less
and no more than one, in a way that respects the  moral  irrelevance of national
boundaries. 8
0
We  do  not  intend  to  challenge  these  general  points  about  fairness  here.
Rather, our basic claim is that if these points are meant to provide a defense of
the per capita  approach, they run into serious difficulties.  The reason is that the
central  objections  to  the  welfarist  argument  rematerialize  when  fairness,
understood  in  the  ways  sketched  above,  is our guide.  First,  to  the  extent that
some  of the  most populous  states  are wealthy,  the  per capita  approach  is  not
fair  at  all  since  it  has  some  of  the  same  vices  as  the  status  quo  approach.
Second, per capita allocations have the disadvantage of giving large numbers of
permits  to  highly  populated  nations  that  have  relatively  little  to  lose  from
climate  change.  Finally,  it  remains  true  that  permits  are  allocated  to  the
governments  of poor states, not to the citizens of poor states, and allocations  to
such governments may not help those who are most in need.
2. The atmosphere as common property
There  is  another  type  of fairness  argument  that  has  been  made  about
emissions  rights.  The  atmosphere,  with  its  beneficial  carbon-absorbing
characteristics,  is  common property, belonging  to everyone  in the world.
8 1 A
climate  treaty would close  this commons,  converting it into private property. It
is  only  fair  to  distribute  the  parcels  of property  to  the  former  users  of the
commons, namely, everyone  in the world, on a per capita basis.
One  might  draw an  analogy  to minerals  discovered  in  the  sea bed under
the  high  seas,  which  are  outside  the  sovereignty  of  any  country.  The
Convention  on the  Law of the Sea provides  that revenues  from exploitation of
78.  See NUSSBAUM,  supra note 64.
79.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra  note 41.
80.  See, e.g.,  Altamirano-Cabrera  & Finus, supra note  6 (arguing  for one person,  one vote
analogy);  Paul Baer et al.,  Equity and Greenhouse Gas Responsibility, 289  SCIENCE  2287  (2000)
(arguing that the per capita approach is justified by the principle of "equal rights").
81.  See, e.g.,  Grubb et al., supra note 18,  at 318-19; Ott&  Sachs, supra  note 6, at 168.
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these minerals  should be  distributed "equitably." 82 But  the  analogy  is  at best
incomplete  and in  fact reveals  the limits of the  common property argument. A
climate  treaty,  like a treaty  allowing  for the  exploitation  of minerals,  has two
effects  of present  interest.  First,  both  treaties  generate  revenues:  for permit
sellers,  in  the  climate  case,  and  for  mining  companies,  in  the  mineral  case.
Second,  both  treaties  generate  benefits  for  consumers:  people  benefit  from
abatement  of climate  change, and people  benefit from  the  lower price of, say,
oil.  Because  virtually  everyone  benefits  from  lower  oil  prices,  the  effect  is
spread  around the world. Thus,  the  only remaining  question in  the case  of the
mineral  treaty  is  how  to  distribute  revenues  fairly.  In  the  climate  case,  the
climate effects are extremely variable-hurting some people very badly, having
no  effect  on  others,  and  benefiting  still  others. 83  From  the  standpoint  of
fairness, it would  be strange  to ignore  these harmful  effects while  considering
only  the  revenue  effects.  The  analogy  to  common  property  is  not helpful;  it
distracts  from  the  relevant  question,  which  is  the  distribution  of all  treaty
effects across the world's population.
3. Treatment of the similarly situated
Suppose that we understand the idea of fairness not in redistributive  terms,
but as a requirement  that similarly  situated people  be  treated similarly. As  we
saw  above,  the  per  capita  approach  is  not  attentive  to  the  differential
distributional effects of climate  change and abatement costs, but in effect gives
every person  the same  asset.  From one perspective,  the  main objection  to this
feature of the per capita system is that it means that wealth does not necessarily
go  to  the  poor.  But holding  wealth  constant,  it  might  also  seem  unfair  that
frugal individuals  who have produced  low  levels of greenhouse  gas emissions
receive  the  same payout as profligates  who  have produced  high levels.  And  it
might also seem unfair that people who are most hurt by climate change  receive
the  same  payout  as  those  who  are  least  hurt  (or  even  benefited)  by climate
change.  Finally,  we  might  think people  who  are  most  hurt by  the  abatement
efforts  mandated  by  the  climate  treaty  should  receive  some  kind  of
compensation.  Consider,  for example,  low-income  workers  who  commute  to
work  and  must  pay  higher  bus  fares  or  fuel  prices.  One  might  argue  that
fairness  requires  that these people  receive  permits,  so  that they  do not bear a
disproportionate  cost of the treaty regime.
82.  See Law of the Sea Convention, supra  note 20.
83.  One  might  argue  that  minerals  extracted  pursuant  to a  treaty  will  have  differential
effects, mainly benefiting those who already have a high demand for the mineral. We suspect that,
in practice,  the drafters  of the Law of the Sea Convention  anticipated that  the overall effect of a
mineral  discovery  on worldwide  prices  will be  slight;  but to the  extent that  this is  not the case,
then  those  differential  effects  should  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  determine  equitable
distribution.
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C. The Per Capita  Approach as an Incompletely Theorized Agreement
We  have  seen  that  in  principle,  significant  global  redistribution  is
plausibly  justified  by  considerations  of  both  welfare  and  fairness.  But  in
practice,  such  redistribution does not occur. For example,  there  is no evidence
that the United  States wants to transfer hundreds  of billions of dollars  to poor
people  in India  or  China  rather  than  the  tens  of millions  of dollars  that  are
currently  appropriated.84  In  these  circumstances,  defenders  of  per  capita
allocations  might  argue  that  their  approach  has  three  virtues.  First, the  per
capita  approach  might be  feasible  even  if a preferred  form of redistribution is
not.  Second,  such  an  approach  might  provide  the  basis  for  a  kind  of
incompletely  theorized  agreement  among  those  who  have  different  moral
commitments,  or who  are unsure  about the  appropriate  moral commitments  in
the  international  domain.  Third,  per  capita  allocation  might,  because  of  its
simplicity and attractiveness, provide a plausible focal point for political action,
a basis  for an  international agreement  to which  many nations could  subscribe,
even  if it  would  be  fanciful  to  suggest  that  wealthy  nations  might  sign  an
international  agreement in which they  agree to transfer hundreds of billions  of
dollars to poor nations. 
85
We  will return  to feasibility  in  the  next Section.  For the  moment,  let us
add a further consideration. Wealthy nations,  including the United  States,  face
serious  risks  from  climate  change,  and  to  reduce  those  risks,  they  need
international  cooperation.  Indeed,  it  is  increasingly  clear  that  they  need
cooperation  from the developing  world. To obtain that cooperation, they  might
well  be  willing  to  expend  resources  that  they  would not  give  in  foreign  aid.
Consider  some  illustrative  numbers. 86  Suppose  that  the  United  States  would
lose  3  percent  in  annual  GDP  from  "business  as  usual,"  in  the  form  of no
international  agreement  at  all.  Suppose  that  the  ideal  international  agreement
would cost the  United States 0.5  percent in  annual GDP, while  reducing  the 3
percent loss to a  1 percent loss, for a net gain of 1.5 percent. Suppose, however,
that developing countries  reject this agreement,  on the ground that its costs  are
too high  and  its benefits  too low,  and  that developing  nations  seek either  an
agreement with different content or with  some kind of financial assistance.  The
different  content  might mean  a worse  cost-benefit  ratio  for the United  States.
On the stipulated numbers, the United States should be willing to pay up to  1.5
percent  of annual  GDP  to obtain  the  benefits  of an  international  agreement.
84.  The United  States awarded  $23  million  in aid  to China for  democracy,  human  rights,
and rule  of law  programs,  and  $125  million  in  aid  to  India  in  2006.  See THOMAS  LUM,  CRS
REPORT  FOR CONGRESS,  U.S.  FOREIGN AID  TO EAST  AND  SOUTH  ASIA:  SELECTED RECIPIENTS  14,
29 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL3136
2 .pdf.
85.  See, e.g., Grubb et al.,  supra  note  18, at 319.
86.  For  a  study suggesting  that  the numbers  here  are in  a  plausible  general  ballpark,  see
DALE  W.  JORGENSON  ET  AL.,  PEW  CENTER  ON  GLOBAL  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  U.S.  MARKET
CONSEQUENCES  OF  GLOBAL  CLIMATE  CHANGE  (2004),  available at http://www.pewclimate.org/
global-warming-in-depth/allreports/marketconsequences.
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And indeed, there  is evidence that wealthy  nations are willing to pay nontrivial
amounts  to  poorer  ones  in  return  for  their  cooperation  in  international
agreements.87
Whatever  its  implications,  this  argument  does  not  support  a  per  capita
approach  at all. All that  this argument  says is that any climate agreement  will
create a surplus, and it will be necessary, and possibly very difficult,  for nations
to decide  how to  divide  that  surplus. If the  United  States  would gain  a  great
deal  from a treaty,  while a poor nation  such as China  would gain  a  lot less,  it
might  be  necessary  for the  United  States  to  accept  a  smaller  portion  of the
surplus  than China obtains,  even to gain  less  on a per capita basis than  China
does. Meanwhile, India might lose more than the United States does, and these
bargaining  dynamics  might  work  out  in the  United  States'  favor  as between
these two states. In principle, relative wealth should matter to the distribution of
the  surplus.  Whether  on grounds of welfare  or  fairness, poor countries  should
be  entitled to a significant  share,  perhaps through financial  assistance or  some
kind of side  payment. But there is no particular reason to think that the type  of
bargain  that  is  welfare-maximizing,  fair,  or  feasible  should  reflect  relative
population  size rather than  another factor such  as  relative  size  of economy  or
relative advantages from a climate treaty.
A  similar point  could  be  made  about the  possibility  that  the  per  capita
approach  could  reflect  an  incompletely  theorized  agreement.  Suppose  that
nations  acknowledge  that  certain  moral  principles  do,  or  should,  guide
international  relations, but that they disagree about what those moral principles
are. 88  If one  believes  the  rhetoric  of governments,  one  can  identify  a  set  of
standard moral  arguments. Among  developing nations, some argue that the rich
world  has  obligations  to  the  poor  arising  from  the  history  of  colonial
exploitation. 89  Others  argue  that  rich  nations  have  obligations  arising  from
particular policies that they have adopted in the recent past and that continue in
the present,  such  as unfair trade  rules  and the treatment of debt.9 0  Still others
argue  simply  that  resources  that  exist outside  the  sovereign  territory  of each
state  should be  shared.91  Some  rich  nations  are  willing  to  acknowledge  that
they have an ethical obligation to provide aid to the very poorest people. Others
say that they have an  obligation to cooperate  with poor nations, or at least not
to interfere with them, but not necessarily to provide aid.  92
87.  See BARRETT, supra note 21, at 335-54 (2003)  (discussing side-payments).
88.  For a discussion of various  possible moral  positions,  see  NUSSBAUM,  supra note 64,  at
273-324.
89.  U.N.  Hum.  Rts.  Council  [UNHRC],  Report of the  Working  Group on the Right to
Development,  19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/47 (Mar.  14, 2007).
90.  Id. at  18;  see also Stephen  Marks,  The  Human Right  to Development: Between
Rhetoric and Reality, 17  HARV.  HUM.  RTS. J.  137,  141-42 (2004).
91.  See, e.g., Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 20.
92.  These  acknowledgements  can  be  found,  in  vague  terms,  in  such  documents  as
Declaration on the  Right to Development,  G.A.  Res. 41/128,  U.N. GAOR, 41st  Sess., 97th plen.
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Observe  that  these  different  moral  arguments  have  very  different
implications.  Even  among  the  poor  nations,  whose  views  seem  consistent  at
first  sight,  one  can  detect  radically  different  implications  of  the  different
arguments.  If one focuses  on colonial exploitation,  then the major beneficiaries
should  be  former  colonies  (including  rich  states  like  Taiwan),  and  the  major
payers should be former empires  (including Great Britain, Russia, and Portugal
but not so much the United  States). Moreover,  the idea of colonial exploitation
suggests that former colonies should direct their claims at their former masters,
not  to  the  rich world  as  a  whole.  India's  extra  permits,  for  example,  should
come  out of Great  Britain's pocket.  Similarly,  if tariff policy  is the  source  of
complaints,  one would need to determine  which tariff policies were  supported
by whom, and which countries they harmed, which would be a highly complex
and controversial  process.  And  if tariff polices  that  have  adverse  effects  on
other nations (and what tariff policies do not have such  effects?)  should count,
so  should  all other policies  that have  given rise to  legitimate  grievances.  One
would  thus  need  to keep  in  mind  the  particular  grievances  that  some  poor
countries  have  against  other poor  countries  (India  and  Pakistan,  Rwanda  and
Burundi), and allocate permits accordingly.
Even if the rich nations owe extra permits to poor nations, within the class
of poor nations  permits would have to  be  distributed unequally to account for
current  and past  injustices.  Generous  treatment,  such  as  many  rich  nations'
contributions  to the  victims of the  tsunami in  South  Asia  in 2004, would need
to be  subtracted,  lest rich  nations hoard  their  generous impulses  as offsets  to
permit  regimes.  And  all  of  this  would  need  to  be  done  in  a  manner  that
respected the views of those who care about redistribution on grounds solely of
redistributive justice or welfare maximization.
93
Within  countries,  moral  disagreement  of this  type  does  not  necessarily
preclude policy-making,  even on issues  that divide people sharply  along moral
lines.  Typically,  the  policy  that  emerges  reflects  an  incompletely  theorized
agreement. 94  People  with  different  moral  views  can  agree  on  a  policy
consistent  with  their  different  interests  and  different  moral  views,  while
bracketing  their remaining  conflicts  or putting them off until a later  time.  For
example, in the United  States some people support  affirmative  action as  a way
to overcome  past injustices,  while others defend it as a forward-looking  policy
for promoting  certain  social  goals,  such  as  stability.95 The  moral views have
mtg.,  U.N.  Doc.  A/41/53  (Dec. 4,  1986),  and World  Conference  on  Human  Rights, June  14-25,
1993,  Vienna Declaration  and Programme  ofAction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July  12,  1993).
93.  For  an effort  to derive a distribution  system that takes into account historical behavior,
see Sagar, supra note 6.
94.  On  such  agreements  in  general,  see  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  LEGAL  REASONING  AND
POLITICAL  CONFLICT  (1996).  On  the  lack  of  concrete  theoretical  grounding  for  international
agreements, see BARRETT,  supra  note 21.
95.  See  Kathleen  M.  Sullivan,  Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's  Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 HARV.  L. REV.  78 (1986).
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different implications  for how  affirmative  action should  be  designed  and  how
long  it will  last, but those  holding  these  different  views  can  sometimes  agree
enough  to put their weight behind  a program  that furthers  some  of their goals
but not  others.  Similarly,  one  might  argue  that  the  per capita  approach  could
reflect  an  incompletely  theorized  agreement  among  nations  and  individuals
with different but overlapping moral views about what nations owe each other.
This  argument  also  is  weak.  None  of the  moral  views  described  above
would  support  the  claim  that  greenhouse  gas  permits  should  be  distributed
according  to  population  size,  with  the  possible  exception  of the  view  that
commons  should  be  shared.  But  even  that  view  does not  clearly  distinguish
between  per nation sharing and per capita sharing. If there  is a common thread
among  these  theories,  it  is  the  view  that  richer  nations  have  an  ethical
obligation  to  aid  or  cooperate  with  poor  nations.  But  as we  have  seen,  poor
nations and populous nations are not necessarily the same.
IV
FEASIBILITY  ISSUES WITH THE PER CAPITA APPROACH
Thus  far our  focus has been  on  issues of principle. A  general  lesson has
been that there are reasons  for significant redistribution  to poor people  in poor
nations  on grounds of either welfare  or fairness.  In light of such justifications,
the redistributive approach  seems far better than the per capita  approach, which
seems  in turn to be far better than  the status quo approach. The main objection
to  the  redistributive  approach  involves  incentive  effects.  The  question  is
whether  the  welfare  loss  from  such  effects  outweighs  the  welfare  gain  from
redistribution.  It is entirely  plausible  to think that  a climate  change agreement
that includes  significant redistribution will be better, on welfarist grounds, than
one that does not. But any climate  change agreement must also be feasible, and
the  constraints  of feasibility  impose  significant  restrictions  on  the pursuit  of
ideals.  The  poignant  irony  is  that  insistence  on the  first-best  outcome,  as  a
matter of principle, may make the climate change problem intractable,  in a way
that  could  lead  to  disaster  from  the  standpoint  of the  very  nations  that  are
poorest and most vulnerable.
96
A.  State Consent and International  Paretianism
Any  realistic  approach  to  climate  regulation  will  have  to  come  about
through changes in  international  law. Most serious discussion today focuses  on
a  possible  climate  treaty  because  no  nation  can  make  a  serious  dent  in
anticipated  warming on its own.  97  The United Nations Framework  Convention
96.  India  is  the most obvious  example here,  because  it is  unusually vulnerable  to damage
from climate change and also most insistent on per capita allocations. On India's vulnerability, see
NORDHAUS  & BOYER,  supra note 5,  at 91.
97.  See NORDHAUS supra note  10; Posner & Sunstein, supra  note 41.
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on Climate Change of 1992 set the stage for negotiations  that culminated  in the
Kyoto  Protocol  of  1997.98  The  treaty  mandated  that  developed  nations  cut
greenhouse  gas  emissions  over  a  period  of years,  but  imposed  no  emissions
reductions  obligations  on  developing  nations. 99  The  United  States  refused  to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, in part because  the treaty obligated the United States
to make quite  significant emissions  cuts, thereby imposing costs much greater,
in terms of monetary expense,  than those  imposed  on other nations. 100  In  the
most recent round  of negotiations  at Bali in 2007,  the United States  agreed to
resume  negotiations,  with  an  eye  toward  joining  a  new  treaty  that  would
provide for binding greenhouse  gas emission abatement obligations  a few years
hence. 1 01
The  difficulty  of  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  United  States  to  an
international  agreement  illustrates  an important  point:  because  treaties require
the consent of treaty partners, states must believe  that by entering  a treaty they
are serving their national interests. Of course the idea of national interest can be
specified  in  many  different  ways.  But  as  a  first  approximation,  nations
primarily care  about the welfare of their own citizens, not necessarily about the
welfare of citizens of other countries.  1 0 2  A workable  climate  treaty will have to
be  one  that  not  only  serves  the  interests  of the  United  States,  but  also  the
interests  of other major  industrial nations,  including developing  countries  such
as  China and Brazil.  We  have used the term  International  Paretianism  to  refer
to this pragmatic constraint  on treaty-making:  a treaty is  not possible unless it
makes all its signatories better off.
It  should  be  clear  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  we  reject
International Paretianism  in principle. From a welfarist perspective,  a step such
as  genocide  prevention  might  be  justified  even  if  its  national  benefits  are
exceeded by its national costs,  so long as the global benefits  exceed the global
costs. Nor do we insist that International Paretianism  is always a firm constraint
on domestic judgments. It is imaginable,  for example, that domestic  forces will
favor  at  least  some  degree  of altruism,  so  that  nations  will  take  steps  that
promote  global welfare  without promoting domestic welfare.  The only point is
that  domestic  self-interest imposes  a significant  limitation  on what is feasible,
and that  nations  should not  be  expected  to  sign a  climate  change  agreement
from  which  they  are  large-scale  net  losers.  China  is  not  likely  to  sign  an
98.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3.
99.  For valuable discussion, see SCOTT  BARRETT,  WHY COOPERATE?  (2007).
100.  See SUNSTEIN,  supra  note 4, at 91-93.
101.  See Bali Action Plan, supra note 9.
102.  The  best evidence  for  this proposition  is  the  pattern  of foreign  aid.  Poor countries,
understandably,  do not provide  foreign  aid, but middle-income  countries  also do not seem to feel
that they  have  a responsibility  to  help  people  living in  poorer countries.  Rich  countries  provide
foreign aid but are not generous, and scholars have  shown that much (but  not all)  foreign aid can
be traced  to  specific  strategic  interests.  See, e.g.,  Alberto Alesina  &  David Dollar,  Who  Gives
Foreign  Aid to  Whom and Why?, 5 J.  ECON.  GROWTH  33, 55-56 (2000).
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agreement that would cost  it, on net, hundreds of billions of dollars  each  year;
the same  is true of the United States. An important question, then, is whether a
proposed allocation  of emissions  rights  will  require one  nation  to  give a great
deal,  in monetary terms, to others.
Even  if nations  care  only  about  their  economic  well-being,  they  might
well  be  willing  to  join  a  suitably  designed  climate  treaty.  Scientific  and
economic  models  indicate  that, most likely,  substantial  cuts  in  greenhouse  gas
emissions  will  produce  global  benefits  in  excess  of  global  costs. 103  For
purposes of producing agreement,  a  main problem  is  that  climate  change  will
affect  different nations differently,  with  some  being harmed  a  great  deal,  and
others being harmed relatively little, at least over the next one hundred years. 104
For example, the  United States gains less from a treaty than India and  African
nations,  for  example,  simply  because  it  has  far  less  to  lose  from  climate
change. 1 0 5  If a  specified  level  of reductions  will  give  significant  benefits  to
India  and Pakistan, but more  modest benefits  to the  United States and Russia,
the  latter nations might well  be reluctant to accept that level  of reductions, and
might demand some kind of compensation.  106
Even  more  troublesome,  restrictions  on  greenhouse  gas  emissions  will
probably  be  most  costly  for  high-emissions  nations,  including  the  United
States. 107  Indeed, the United  States would have borne  at least half of the total
worldwide  cost  of the  Kyoto  Protocol,  and  perhaps  significantly  more  than
that-a point that helps  explain  its unwillingness  to  ratify the treaty. 1 08 Large
emitters,  facing  significant  costs  from  emissions  reductions  requirements,
therefore  will be unlikely to join a treaty unless  the treaty uses their status quo
emissions  as the baseline  from which to determine cuts.  As a practical  matter,
nations  that  are  already  the  biggest  greenhouse  gas  emitters  will  not join  a
treaty  that requires  them  to  reduce  their emissions  to  the  level  of very  poor
nations;  nor would they enter a treaty that requires them  to pay a lot of money
for permits distributed to poor nations. 1 09
The  pragmatic virtue of the  status  quo approach  is that  it takes seriously
these political  constraints  on  treaty-making.  The  corresponding  problem  with
the per capita approach  is that it would require  smaller industrial  states to  buy
103.  For different  perspectives  converging  on  this  general  conclusion,  see,  for  example,
NORDHAUS,  supra  note  10;  NICHOLAS  STERN,  THE  ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE  (2007).
104.  See NORDHAUS  & BOYER, supra note 5,  at 91.
105.  Id.
106.  Note in this connection  that as  a price  for their  agreement  to participate  in the Kyoto
Protocol,  Russia  and  Eastern  Europe  received  emissions  rights  worth  over  $100  billion.  See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 92.
107.  See Cass  R.  Sunstein,  The  Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the
United  States, 55  UCLA L.  REV. (forthcoming  2008).
108.  See  STEWART  & WIENER, supra note  1, at 49-52.
109.  The  qualification,  of course,  is  that if technological  innovation  sharply  drives  down
the  cost of emissions reductions,  large emitting nations  will be more willing  to accept  significant
restrictions. But there is no sign, at the present, of any such innovation.
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permits  from  larger  developing  states,  violating  International  Paretianism.
There  is  little  reason  that the  rich states would be willing  to  agree  to  such  an
approach.  The  behavior  of  the  United  States,  with  respect  to  the  Kyoto
Protocol, is revealing in this regard. The United States would have had to spend
over  $300  billion  to  comply  with  its  obligations; 11°  it  is  no  accident  that  no
member  of the  United  States  Senate,  Democratic  or  Republican,  supported
ratification.  111
To be  sure, most wealthy  nations send  foreign aid to developing  nations,
so it  would be  a mistake  to  define  their national  interests  in purely  economic
terms. 112  We  have  noted  that  nations  are  capable  of  being  altruistic.  A
country's  national  interest  might  be  understood  as  some  combination  of
altruistic and economic  interests.  The nature of this combination will vary with
domestic  political  pressures.  To  the  extent  that  powerful  domestic
constituencies  want to assist those  in  other nations, the altruistic elements  will
be magnified. One might argue that, given the current level of altruism, nations
would be willing to adopt the per capita approach.
The problem is that the existing level of foreign aid is probably not greatly
lower than the amount that rich states are willing to pay in order to be altruistic.
Such nations are unlikely to  agree  to massive  increases in the redistribution  of
wealth  by entering  a climate treaty that requires  them to bear most of the  cost
of greenhouse  gas  abatement.  One  risk  is  that  if they  agree  to  a  treaty  that
redistributes  wealth, rich  states will  be  tempted to  cut  back on  foreign  aid,  so
that  the redistributive  effect  of the  treaty  will be minimal  or zero.  Consider a
few numbers  in this regard. In 2006,  the United States gave  almost  $24 billion
in  foreign  aid  (a  third  of which  was  to  Iraq).1 3  As  noted,  the  politically
unacceptable  Kyoto  Protocol  would  have  cost  the  United  States  over  $300
billion  over the  indefinite  future,  the  equivalent  of perhaps tens of billions of
dollars  per  year. 114  The per  capita  approach,  as  compared  to  the  status  quo
approach,  would cost  the  United  States  far  more than  that:  as  much  as  $100
billion  per  year for  the  indefinite  future.
1 15  There  is  no  sign  that  the  United
States  would  be  willing  to  pay  that  amount,  well  in  excess  of  its  existing
foreign aid budget, as part of a climate change agreement.
In  sum,  the  feasibility  problem  with  the  per  capita  approach  is  that  it
conflicts with the  state system that  currently organizes the  world. States  might
well  be  willing  to  enter  a  climate  treaty  that  mitigates  climate  change  if the
treaty  creates  restrictions  that  work  off  existing  levels  of greenhouse  gas
110.  See SUNSTEIN,  supra note 4, at 95.
111.  S.  Res. 98,  105th Cong. (1997).
112.  See Alesina & Dollar, supra note  102.
113.  See  Org. for Econ.  Co-Operation  &  Dev. [OECD],  Dev. Assistance  Comm.  [DAC],
U.S. Aid At-a-Glance (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/30/40039096.gif.
114.  See NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 166.
115.  See supra note 29.
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emissions.  Doing  so would serve their national interests.  But given the current
level  of altruism  that  appears  to  exist,  they  are  highly  unlikely  to  adopt  a
distributive goal like that mandated by the per capita approach. To insist on the
per capita approach, then, is most likely to  subvert the best chance for a climate
treaty and hence to render the climate change problem intractable. 
116
B. Defective Governance and  Alternative Means to Redistribute
As is  well  known  in  the  development  literature,  redistributing  wealth  to
poor nations  is  not easy  or  obvious. 117  Large  cash grants  to  governments  are
often  siphoned  off by corrupt  officials.  Loans  are  similarly  abused  and  often
not repaid. Grants and loans not lost to corruption are nonetheless often wasted
because the recipient government  lacks the expertise  and institutional  capacity
to  identify  problems,  monitor  the  disbursement  of  funds,  and  use  them
wisely. 11 8  Donors  have  devised  numerous  means  for  monitoring  and
controlling  the  use  of  funds,  but  these  often  fail  and  frequently  generate
resentment.  In  some  cases,  donors  misunderstand  the  needs  of  the  recipient
countries  and  squander  funds  on  projects  that  do  not  help  people  who  live
there;  in other cases, donors impose conditions that are politically  controversial
and even destabilizing. 119  Donors have  also tried to circumvent corrupt  or inept
governments  by  directing  aid  to  individuals  and  NGOs  rather  than
governments.  But  small  recipients  are  hard  to monitor  and  control  and have
limited impact,  and aid programs  involving multiple  recipients  are difficult  to
coordinate. 12 0   Painful  trial  and  error  have  suggested  some  promising
approaches,  which  emphasize  decentralization,  sensitivity  to  context,  and
experimentation.1 21 Whatever the  merits  and  demerits  of these  approaches,  at
least they do not repeat the errors of the past.
Now  consider  a  climate  treaty,  which  most  likely  would  require  the
allocation  of valuable  permits  to  the  governments  of poor  states,  the  same
corrupt  or  ineffective  governments  that  have  misused  foreign  aid.  It  seems
116.  For a  sophisticated  demonstration  of this problem,  see  Altamirano-Cabrera  &  Finus,
supra note  6  (arguing  that  equitable  schemes  are  more  likely  to  be  unstable  than  "pragmatic"
schemes that take account of relative  economic power).
117.  For pessimistic  empirical  assessments of the relationship  between  aid and  economic
growth,  see  Simeon  Djankov  et  al.,  Does Foreign Aid  Help?, 26  CATO  J.  1 (2006);  William
Easterly  et  al.,  Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment, 94 AM.  ECON.  REV.  774  (2004);  Robert  J.
Barro  &  Jong-Wha  Lee,  IMF Programs: Who  Is  Chosen and What Are  the Effects?  (NBER
Working  Paper  No.  8951,  2002),  available  at  http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstractid=313652.
118.  See, e.g., WILLIAM  EASTERLY,  THE WHITE MAN'S  BURDEN  60-112 (2006).
119.  Simeon Djankov  et al.,  The Curse of Aid (Universitat  Pompeu Fabra Working  Paper,
2006), available  at www.cato.org/pubs/journallcj26nl/cj26nl-1  .pdf.
120.  See, e.g.,  Arnab  Acharya et al., Aid Proliferation:  How Responsible Are the Donors?
(IDS  Working  Paper  No.  214,  2004),  available at www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp214.pdf
(pointing out the costs  to donee  countries of dealing with multiple donors).
121.  See Easterly, supra note  11 7.
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highly  likely that  some  of these  governments  would misuse  these permits  as
well, for example, by transferring  them to cronies. 1 22
Even if the governments of developing countries are not corrupt, they will
still not necessarily  use revenues  from permits in the  way that donor countries,
motivated by altruism,  would approve.  Recall that the  per capita approach was
justified  by  redistributive  concerns:  all  else  being  equal,  a  climate  pact  that
favored  developing  nations would  be  desirable.  If large  countries  tend to  be
poor,  then  the  per  capita  approach  has  attractive  redistributive  features.  The
redistributive approach  is even better than the per capita approach, on this view.
But if the  redistributive  approach  is  not  practicable,  the  per  capita  approach
might be second best.
Any  realistic  climate  treaty  will  do no more than  allocate  permits  to the
governments  of developing  nations.  After -these nations  sell  the  permits,  they
will be  free  to  use  the  revenue  however they  wish.  But  the  governments  of
developing  nations  are  not particularly  generous  to  their  poor.  In a  state  like
Guatemala,  for  example,  taxes  are  low,  apparently  because  wealthy  people
disproportionately  influence the political  process. 123  It seems  unlikely that  the
Guatemalan  government,  having  received  a  windfall  of  permits,  would
redistribute  the  revenues  to  the  poor.  More  likely,  the  government  would
simply  lower  taxes  on  the  wealthy  even  more.  The  per  capita  approach  or
redistributive  approach,  therefore,  would  not  end  up  helping  the  very  poor;
these  approaches  would  end  up  helping  wealthy  people  who  live  in  poor
countries.
Even  worse,  the  development  literature  has  identified  the  "resource
curse,"  the  idea  that  poor  states  that  enjoy  rich  natural  resources  do worse,
politically or economically, than poor states that do not.  24  Theories abound for
this phenomenon;  one  such theory  is that  a large  pool  of resources  in  a state
with poor institutions encourages  insurgencies, since the insurgents can finance
the conflict  by seizing  control  over the resources.  The resource curse  also has
been  cited  as  a  possible  explanation  for the  ineffectiveness  of foreign  aid:  a
windfall  of  foreign  aid  is  like  the  discovery  of oil,  and  may  be  similarly
destabilizing. 1 25  If this  theory  is  right,  distributing  valuable  permits  to  poor
countries may cause civil war rather than prosperity.
Whether these theories  are sound  or not, the point for present purposes is
that repeating the  errors of development  policy by using a climate  treaty  as an
opportunity  to engage  in  foreign  aid  would  be  hazardous.  The  distribution  of
122.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 41.
123.  See, e.g.,  U.N.  Hum.  Rts.  Council  [UNHRC],  Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary  or Arbitrary Executions,  Civil  and Political Rights,  Including  the
Questions of Disappearances  and Summary Executions, Addendum, Mission to Guatemala (21-25
August  2006),  58-61,  U.N.  Doe.  A/HRC/4/20/Add.2  (Feb.  19,  2007)  (prepared by  Philip
Alston).
124.  See AUTY,  supra note 58.
125.  See Djankov,supra note  119.
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permits on  a per capita basis,  in  order to favor poor states,  would be just such
an  effort. If giving piles  of cash  to  poor states  has  failed  to  help  them, then
giving them piles of permits will also fail to help them. To the extent that this is
so, they  should receive  no more  permits than  are necessary to induce  them to
internalize the external climate effects of polluting activity.
CONCLUSION
From  the  standpoint  of  both  welfare  and  fairness,  there  are  strong
arguments  for large  amounts  of international  redistribution.  If resources  from
wealthy  people in wealthy nations  could be transferred  to poor people  in poor
nations,  global  welfare  would  be  significantly  increased.  At  the  same  time,
arguments  from  fairness  suggest  that  people  should  not  have  far  worse
prospects  in  life  simply because  of the  nation  in which  they  are born. These
arguments  have led many analysts to suggest  that the per capita  approach is the
best  way to  allocate greenhouse  gas emission  rights. In the  developing  world,
that approach has widespread  support, 126 and there  is no question that it will be
pressed aggressively in international negotiations.
We  have urged that claims  from both welfare  and fairness  fail to provide
strong justifications  for the per capita approach. A central  problem is that some
wealthy  nations  have  large  populations  and  some  poor  nations  have  small
populations.  Per  capita  allocations  of  emissions  rights  would  result  in
substantial  benefits  for  China  and  India,  both  of which  are  poor. But  many
nations  are  significantly poorer than those  nations, and a directly redistributive
approach  would be  a far more effective  way of assisting those  who need help.
Moreover,  any  international  agreement  will  benefit  some  nations  more  than
others and cost  some nations more than  others. In these circumstances,  the per
capita approach gives the appearance, not the reality, of fairness.
It remains true that from the standpoint of welfare and fairness,  per capita
allocations  would  be  far  better  than  the  status  quo  approach.  But  here,  as
elsewhere,  the best is the enemy of the good. A climate treaty  that included the
optimal  level  of emissions  would be  good.  A climate  treaty  that  included the
optimal  level  of emissions  reductions  and  the  optimal  level  of redistribution
would be  better still.  But such  a  treaty  is  much  less  likely to be  possible. On
welfarist  grounds,  and putting  incentive  effects to  one  side,  the  redistributive
approach  is superior to the per capita approach, which is in turn superior to the
status  quo  approach.  Unfortunately,  the  best approaches  in  principle  are also
least likely to be feasible in practice.
We have not attempted here to say exactly how emissions rights should be
allocated;  our modest  goal has been to  challenge the widely held view  that per
capita allocations  should be the foundation  for an international  agreement.  But
a more  general  point  does emerge,  and it  is ironic  and potentially even tragic.
126.  See VANDERHEIDEN,  supra note 6, at 66-69.
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Because of the constraints  of feasibility,  the insistence  by  poor nations  on  the
best approaches in principle would likely undermine current efforts to convince
the world to take significant steps to reduce greenhouse  gas emissions-and  as
a result  would most harm those  very  nations that are  especially  vulnerable  to
the effects of climate change. 
1 27
127.  For a  clear  demonstration  of their  greater  vulnerability,  see  CLIMATE  CHANGE  RISK
REPORT, supra note 40.
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 93 200994  CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW  [Vol.  97:51
HeinOnline  -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 94 2009